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Abstract
We study the causes of inequality in human capital accumulation across ethnic and religious
groups. An overlapping generations model in which agents decide how much time to invest in
human capital versus ethnic capital shows that the demand for human capital is a¤ected positively
by parental and groups older cohort human capital, and negatively by group size. Two ex-ante
identical groups may diverge in human capital accumulation, with the divergence mostly occurring
among their low-ability members. Furthermore, group and ethnic fragmentation increases the
demand for human capital. We validate these predictions using household data from Nigeria where
ethnicity and religion are the primary identity cleavages. We document persistent ethnic and
religious inequality in educational attainment. Members of ethnic groups that historically converted
to Christianity outperform those whose ancestors converted to Islam. Consistent with theory, there
is little di¤erence between the high-ability members of these groups, but low-ability members of
historically Muslim groups choose Koranic education as an alternative to formal education, even
when formal education is free. Moreover, more religiously fragmented ethnic groups fare better,
and local ethnic fragmentation increases the demand for formal education. Our analysis sheds light
on the political context that underlines the recent violent opposition to "western education" in the
country.
JEL classication numbers: A13, D9, I21, I24, N3, O1
Keywords: Group Inequality, Human Capital, Ethnic Capital, Ethnic Politics, Koranic Educa-
tion.
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1 Introduction
Inequality across social groups with distinct identities and cultures is one of the most important
issues facing modern societies. Disparities in economic opportunities, employment, earnings, and
asset holding are generally perceived as symptoms of discrimination against the less well-o¤ groups,
which often leads to social animosities, riots, and violent conicts.1 In a perfectly competitive market
economy, group inequality partly results from group di¤erences in the level of human capital. A large
body of literature has suggested that such di¤erences are in part attributable to cultural factors (e.g.,
Ogbu (1978), Fordham and Ogbu (1986), Fordham (1996), Austen-Smith and Fryer (2005)), with
some groups adopting an oppositional attitude towards formal education, and others encouraging or
pressuring their members into intensive community activities that leave little time for human capital
acquisition. Given the grave social consequences of individual and group inequality, undertaking an
analysis of the individual and group factors that inuence the educational choice of individuals is
important for informing the design of public policy.
In this paper, we analyze the implications of people to organize into culturally homogeneous groups
which act as closed networks for individual and group inequality in human capital accumulation. The
set of potential groups arises exogenously, but adherence to group values is endogenous. Education,
through which human capital is built, is promoted by a secular state as a universal value. Each
individual chooses how much time to invest in acquiring formal education (or human capital) and how
much to invest in strengthening his relationship with his ethnic group (ethnic capital). We study the
determinants of such a choice, focusing on the interplay of individual characteristics such as ability
with group characteristics such as group size and ability. From our ndings, we also identify a new
mechanism through which social fragmentation a¤ects human capital demand. We test the theoretical
predictions using nationally representative household data from Nigeria, where ethnicity and religion
are the primary identity cleavages.
Nigeria has over 250 ethnic groups2 and counts numerous religious denominations which can be
categorized as Christian and Muslim. There is a long documented history of a diverging attitude of
Christians and Muslims towards formal education in this country. This reality is evidenced in Figure
1-A, which shows the Christian-Muslim gap in formal educational attainment by age. Muslims are at
a disadvantage early on, and fall further behind over time, lagging Christians by more than 4 years of
education by age 24. There is also a great deal of inequality in educational attainment between ethnic
groups. Figure 2-A shows that Yoruba, Niger-Delta, and Igbo children, with 10 years of education by
age 24, are consistently more educated than the Middle-Belt (8 years) and the Hausa/Fulani/Kanuri
(4 years). These inequalities continue to persist even after the supply of educational infrastructure at
the neighborhood level is accounted for (see Figure 1-B and Figure 2-B).
Why is ethnic inequality in educational attainment so high in Nigeria? Given the diverging attitude
1See, e.g., Esteban and Ray (2011), Mitra and Ray (2014), and Sen (1973).
2 It is common to aggregate the di¤erent ethnic groups based on linguistic and cultural a¢ nities into ve major
categories: The Hausa/Fulani/Kanuri of the core North, the Igbo of the South East, the Yoruba of the South West, the
Isoko/Urhobo/Edo/Ijaw/Ek/Ibibio of the Niger-Delta region, and the Tiv/Igala/Idoma/Gwari of Central Nigeria, also
known as the Middle-Belt region (NISER (1997)).
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of Christians and Muslims towards formal education, part of the answer could be found in the fact
that religious a¢ liation varies a great deal across ethnic groups in this country. Indeed, Figure 3 shows
that Christians are more concentrated among the Igbo, the Niger-Delta, and the Middle-Belt, whereas
Muslims are more concentrated among the Hausa/Fulani/Kanuri. Clearly, ethnic groups that invest
more in formal education are predominantly Christian. In predominantly Muslim groups, children tend
to invest heavily in Koranic education, losing ground with respect to investment in human capital.3
As Figure 4 shows, among the Hausa/Fulani/Kanuri, 23.5% of children have only a Koranic education,
in stark constrast to the Igbo (0.1%), the Yoruba (0.4%), the Niger-Delta (0.4%), and the Middle-Belt
(2.7%). Clearly, Koranic education is an important alternative to formal education.
The evidence therefore suggests that religious attitude towards formal education may explain ethnic
inequality in educational investment in Nigeria, but it may not explain it all. In fact, despite the fact
that Muslims are far more represented among the Yoruba (46% of the Yoruba are Muslim) than among
the Igbo (0.3%), the Niger-Delta (2.4%), and the Middle-Belt (31%), Yoruba children perform better
than children in these other ethnic groups. This suggests that there are other driving forces of group
inequality. And even if attitude towards formal education were the only explanatory factor of group
inequality, one would still wonder why such attitude varies so much across groups. Why are certain
groups more likely to invest in ethnic capital than others? Why are the Middle-Belt children seven
times more likely than their Yoruba counterparts to choose Koranic education over formal education
despite having a much smaller proportion of Muslims? What are the main driving forces of group
inequality?
Our goal is to answer these questions. We develop an overlapping generations model of a society
composed of two ethnic groups.4 Each individual belongs to one ethnic group and makes a decision of
whether to invest in ethnic capital or human capital. By investing in ethnic capital, we mean that the
individual either attends schools run by the community, or works towards learning a particular skill in
which the ethnic group specializes. Investing in ethnic capital makes the individual eligible for work
in the ethnic labor market where he competes only with other members of his own ethnic group who
also invested in ethnic capital. The benet to the individual from such an investment is the wages he
earns in the ethnic labor market. These wages depend on the number of people of his ethnicity who
also invest in ethnic capital and the size of resources controlled by his ethnic group, which we call
ethnic wealth. By investing in human capital, we mean that the individual attends state-run school
to acquire formal education. Such an investment makes the individual eligible for work in the formal
labor market where he competes with all individuals, irrespective of ethnicity, who also invested in
human capital. The benet to the individual from investing in human capital depends on the wages
in the formal labor market, which are a function of the total number of people from all ethnic groups
who invest in human capital.
We further assume that the cost of acquiring education decreases with higher ability and total
human capital investment by the older cohort of the same ethnic group. The motivation is that
3Koranic education is one of the many forms of ethnic capital that exist in Nigeria.
4 In the model, ethnic groups are also meant for religious and ethno-religious groups. In the empirical analysis, we
show the e¤ects of both ethnicity and religion on the outcome.
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the older cohort from the same ethnic group may help the current cohort in the skill acquisition
process, implying that the greater the size of the educated older cohort, the greater are the benets
for all members of the current cohort. We later weaken this assumption by allowing for cross-ethnic
interactions where each individuals cost of human capital acquisition depends on a weighted average
of the levels of human capital from di¤erent ethnic groups.5
The model generates testable predictions. First, it shows that two groups that are ex-ante identical
may diverge in human capital accumulation (T1). Hence, groups that are similarly sized, begin with
the same level of ethnic wealth, and have the same distribution of ability amongst their members
might in equilibrium have very di¤erent levels of human capital. Second, if two groups di¤er in human
capital accumulation, this di¤erence mostly occurs among the low-ability members of both groups,
since the very able members from any ethnic group can always choose the more rewarding investment
in human capital (T2). Third, we nd that an individualss demand for human capital is positively
a¤ected by the ability (or human capital) of his parents and that of the older generation of his ethnic
group (T3). Fourth, an individuals human capital is negatively a¤ected by the wealth of his ethnic
group (T4). In an ethnic democracy such as Nigeria, the wealth of a group is correlated with its size,
as larger ethnic groups have more political power, enabling them to extract more resources. Fifth,
allowing ethnic wealth to be a function of group size, we nd that ethnic and group fragmentation
positively a¤ects the demand for human capital (T5). When we allow for cross-ethnic interactions,
we see that, under certain conditions, higher levels of cross-ethnic interaction reduce the di¤erence in
levels of human capital between ethnic groups.
We test these predictions of the model using nationally representative household data from Nigeria.
First, we seek to explain cross-group di¤erences in formal educational performance, testing prediction
(T1). They may be attributable to demographic and socioeconomic conditions that are known to
vary across ethnic groups in most countries. In multivariate analyses, we therefore control for a range
of individual and household level demographic and socioeconomic variables. The advantage of the
Yoruba over other ethnic groups declines in magnitude, but remains statistically signicant.
Given that the formal educational infrastructure may not be evenly supplied across di¤erent re-
gions, the remaining di¤erences could be due to the fact that some ethnic groups benet more than
others. To address this issue, as in Figures 1-B and 2-B, we control for neighborhood xed e¤ects,
in the assumption that individuals residing within the same neighborhood have the same exposure to
educational supply.6 We nd that the di¤erences between the Yoruba, the Igbo and the Niger-Delta
no longer persist, but the Middle-Belt and the Hausa/Fulani/Kanuri still lag behind the Yoruba.
The cost of formal education might prevent members of certain groups from enrolling in school. To
address this issue, we exploit the fact that enrollment in public primary schools was declared free in
Nigeria in 1999. This measure was most likely to impact younger individuals. We therefore estimate
5These assumptions remind the "strategic complementary" assumption well known in the literature (see, e.g., Glaeser
and Scheinkman (2000) on some of its formulations). See also Belhaj and Deroian (2011) for similar assumptions in a con-
text in which agents allocate time between two activities. Our assumptions imply within-group strategic complementarity
in ethnic capital and both within-group and across-group complementarity in human capital.
6A neighborhood in the data is a small area, similar to a census tract.
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the e¤ect of ethnicity on education for distinct age groups, nding that the Yoruba, the Igbo, the
Niger-Delta and the Middle-Belt aged 5-9 years do not di¤er in their educational attainment, but the
disadvantage of the Hausa/Fulani/Kanuri remains economically and statistically signicant across all
the age groups
The diverging outcome of the Hausa/Fulani/Kanuri is consistent with the prediction stated in
(T1) based on the existence of multiple equilibria. Indeed, that the Hausa/Fulani/Kanuri individuals
continue to lag behind after we control for a range of factors clearly corroborates our earlier observation
that investment in ethnic capital (often in the form of religious education) is heavier in that group
as compared to other groups. However, according to prediction (T2), high-ability individuals are
more likely to choose human capital over ethnic capital regardless of their group attachment to an
oppositional norm. This implies that cross-ethnic di¤erences in educational performance should be
smaller among high-ability individuals and more pronounced among those of low ability. We test
and validate this theoretical prediction, using parental education and wealth as measures of ability.7
Furthermore, to control for common religious factors inherent in Islam, we replicate this test for Muslim
individuals only, and we nd that the poor performance of Hausa/Fulani/Kanuri children relative to
all other groups persists only for those children whose parents have no education or are very poor,
clearly corroborating prediction (T2).
We also validate our third prediction according to which an individual, regardless of his ability, is
more likely to invest in human capital if his parents human capital or that of the older cohort of his
group is high (T3). We measure a groups older cohorts human capital by the neighborhood-level share
of adults in that group with at least a secondary school education. We validate the prediction, nding,
for example, that a one-point increase in the neighborhood share of educated Hausa/Fulani/Kanuri
adults increases education by 5.2 years among Hausa/Fulani/Kanuri children, but has little e¤ect on
children from other tribes. In general, these e¤ects are mostly conned within ethnic groups, showing
a clear network e¤ect.
Next, we test the prediction that individuals belonging to smaller ethnic groups are more likely to
invest in human capital than those belonging to larger groups (T4). We test this prediction in two
di¤erent ways. First, we construct a binary variable for minority status based on whether an individual
belongs to the minority religion within his ethnic group (for instance, a Muslim Igbo is considered a
minority whereas a Christian Igbo is a majority). Consistent with the theory, we nd that minorities
invest more in formal education. Second, we estimate the e¤ect of an individuals ethnic group
representation in his neighborhood on his educational attainment, and nd that individuals belonging
to smaller groups perform better than those belonging to larger groups.
7Measuring a childs ability by the education and wealth of his parents is standard in the literature. It is argued
that higher-ability parents can help their children with homework, facilitating human capital acquisition. According to
a very large literature in Biology and Labor Economics, parental education and wealth have a direct impact on child
ability as measured by IQ and cognitive and non-cognitive skills (Løken, Mogstad and Wiswall (2011), Currie (2009),
Currie and Moretti (2003), Lundborg, Nilsson and Rooth (2012), Almond and Currie (2011)). Indeed, higher parental
SES has a positive e¤ect on a range of childrens health indicators (Case, Lubotsky and Paxson (2002), Glewwe (1999),
Pongou, Ezzati and Salomon (2006), Pongou, Salomon and Ezzati (2006), Currie (2009)), and better health in childhood
positively a¤ects mental and cognitive ability (Weinreb et al. (2002), Glewwe and Jacoby (1993), Chang et al. (2002),
Currie (2009), Currie and Stabile (2006), Currie (2000)), as well as productivity in adulthood (Currie et al. (2010)).
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As a corollary of the latter prediction, ethnic fragmentation should have a positive e¤ect on the
demand for formal education (T5). Indeed, we nd that individuals who reside in more ethnically
heterogeneous neighborhoods have more education. Interestingly, when we control both for the size
of an individuals ethnic group and ethnic fragmentation, only the latter variable remains statistically
signicant, further validating the model mechanism that the positive e¤ect of ethnic fragmentation on
the demand for formal education is just a reection of the positive e¤ect of ethnic minority status on
this outcome.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we situate our study within the
literature. Section 3 presents the theoretical model and its predictions. We test the model in Section
4, and conclude our study in Section 5.
2 Related Literature
Our paper is related to the literature on group inequality. Initiated by Becker (1957), Arrow (1973), and
Phelps (1972), this literature has looked at sustained group inequality arising due to discrimination.
Loury (1977), Durlauf (1996), and Benabou (1996) explain group inequality by segregation. Recent
papers focus on education and occupational choice (see, e.g., Mookherjee et al. (2010a), Bowles et
al. (2014)). Our paper nds that group inequality in educational investment can arise out of ex-ante
identical conditions. This nding implies that inequality may not be explained by factors upon which
policymakers can act. However, we also identify several tangible sources of inequality. Ethnic wealth
(resources available to an ethnic group for productive activities), for instance, is a potential driver of
di¤erences in educational attainment across ethnic groups. We show theoretically that communities
with lower ethnic wealth are more likely to choose investments in human capital over ethnic capital.
A similar result can be seen in Munshi and Rosenzweig (2006) where they show that girls who are
excluded from the benets of ethnic wealth are more likely to invest in human capital. In Luke and
Munshi (2011), it is shown that children from the lower castes who have lower ethnic wealth (in the
form of caste-based insurance networks) are more likely to invest in a better education.
Our result that a childs human capital is partially determined by his parents human capital as
well as the average human capital of his ethnic community is consistent with Borjas (1992), who
also argues that if parentshuman capital di¤ers by ethnicity, this is likely to persist across several
generations. We also add new results to this literature. For instance, the nding that members of
smaller groups are more likely to invest in human capital is new. Also, whereas ethnic fragmentation
has been shown to decrease the "supply" of public goods (e.g., Easterly and Levine (1997), Miguel
and Gugerty (2005)), our study shows that fragmentation increases the "demand" for human capital.
Our assumption that ethnic groups play the role of social networks through which members may
obtain information about job opportunities is consistent with studies that have found social contacts
to play an important role in labor market and other economic outcomes (Granovetter (1973, 1995),
Fafchamps (2010)). Granovetter (1973) argues that new information ows to people through "weak
ties", and Granovetter (1995) empirically shows that connections play an important role in job nd-
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ing. The latter study is consistent with Fafchamps (2010) who, analyzing data from three African
countries, nds that networks positively a¤ect trust and information sharing, and that better con-
nected individuals obtain more prosperous businesses. The assumption that connections matter has
also motivated theoretical studies on the role of exogenous networks on employment and inequality
(e.g., Calvó-Armengol and Jackson (2004, 2005), Montgomery (2001), Topa (2001)). Importantly, our
empirical ndings corroborate this assumption, as the positive e¤ects of community human capital on
youth education are mostly conned within ethnic groups.
Our paper contributes to the very large literature on conformity and the formation and persistence
of identity, culture, and social norms.8 Akerlof and Kranton (2000) incorporate the psychology and
sociology of identity into an economic model of behavior, and show that identity determines economic
outcomes. In their model, identity is dened by "a persons self-image" and her assigned category,
each category being characterized by a set of prescriptions and norms indicating the behavior to which
individuals in the category should conform. Conforming to or deviating from her category-prescribed
norms results in gains or losses in identity. The model sheds light on di¤erences in school achievement
across di¤erent categories of students. Bodenhorn and Ruebeck (2003) study the cost and benets
of adopting a mulato or a black racial identity among the African-American population in the mid-
nineteenth century. Munshi and Wilson (2010) look at the role of identity in mobility. As in our model,
they allow people to choose between two forms of capital accumulation, and this choice determines
the probability of social mobility.
There are only a few empirical studies that examine the e¤ect of identity on education and em-
ployment, and most of them focus on the U.S., Canada, and Europe (e.g., Fordham and Ogbu
(1986), Ainsworth-Darell and Downey (1998), Fryer and Levitt (2004), Austen-Smith and Fryer (2005),
Fryer and Torelli (2009), Constant and Zimmermann (2008), Pendakur and Pendakur (2005), Calvó-
Armengol, Pattachini and Zenou (2009)). With a notable exception (Ainsworth-Darell and Downey
(1998)), there is a large consensus in these literatures that identity matters in determining outcomes,
with those who adopt an oppositional culture or those who do not integrate or assimilate with the
majority culture lagging behind.
Similar to those previous studies, our paper links ethnic and religious identity to educational
choice in a country where active opposition against "western education" has been demonstrated in
some population subgroups. However, our analysis, despite containing some of the elements of all these
other studies (e.g., peers e¤ects, strategic complementarity, etc.), di¤ers in some important respects.
Our main contribution consists of identifying important individual- and group-level determinants of
human capital versus ethnic capital accumulation. First, our ndings imply that group-level di¤erences
in human capital do not necessarily need to be explained by di¤erences in initial attitude towards
education or ability. In fact, as already mentioned, two ex-ante identical groups may end up having
di¤erent levels of educational attainment (see prediction (T1)). The default explanation for such
a divergence is that the two groups are separated. However, we also show that assimilation is not
8See, e.g., Bernheim (1994), Akerlof (1980), Bisin and Verdier (2000), Glaeser and Scheinkman (2000), Kandel and
Lazear (1992), Fershtman and Weiss (1998), Kandori (1992), Akerlof (1980), and Currarini, Jackson and Pin (2008).
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a su¢ cient condition for convergence in human capital accumulation across groups, as two groups
might still di¤er despite being perfectly assimilated. Second, by treating di¤erent ethnic groups as
local economies as in Lundberg and Startz (1998), we show that smaller groups are more likely to
invest in human capital. Importantly, this result implies that members of the same ethnic group who
reside in di¤erent locations within a country are likely to di¤er with respect to how they accumulate
human capital, with smaller subgroups faring better than larger subgroups. This result sheds light on
the observation that second and subsequent generation migrants whose parents have left their region
of origin to settle in another region within a country generally do better than their co-ethnics who
have remained in their homeland. While this has usually been explained by the positive selectivity of
migrants, our results suggest that the same outcome would obtain even if migrants do not di¤er from
non-migrants in terms of ability distribution.
By showing that inequalities in human capital accumulation across ethnic and religious groups in
Nigeria are partially due to the fact that certain members of historically Muslim communities choose
Koranic education as an alternative to formal education, we prove that these inequalities are also a
consequence of di¤erential historical exposure to Christianity and Islam during the pre-colonial period.
In this regard, our ndings are consistent with studies on the historical origins of di¤erences in cultures,
norms, and economic outcomes (Guiso, Sapienza and Zingales (2008), Huillery (2009), Nunn (2009),
Tabellini (2010), Nunn and Wantchekon (2011), Okoye and Pongou (2015)). In particular, studies on
the long-run economic impacts of historical religious exposure have mainly focused on the e¤ect of
Protestantism.9 The economic e¤ects of Islam have attracted less attention. Most of the few studies on
this topic use cross-country data, and therefore cannot adequately separate the e¤ect of religion from
other country level factors that may a¤ect outcomes. In contrast, we use household-level data that
enable us to control for neighborhood xed e¤ects, allowing us to address endogeneity issues related
to self-selection into certain areas or to the non-random supply of formal educational infrastructure.
We also nd theoretically and empirically that local ethnic fragmentation, by creating smaller
groups, positively a¤ects the demand for formal education. Given the essential role of human capital
in the production of wealth in technologically advanced societies (Gary Becker (1962, 1964), Galor and
Weil (2000), Acemoglu (2009), Mincer (1974)), our results imply that local ethnic fragmentation may
have a positive e¤ect on local economic growth by positively a¤ecting the likelihood that individuals
pursue formal education. Other studies have shown that ethnic fragmentation slows economic growth
and negatively a¤ects the supply of public goods (e.g., Easterly and Levine (1997), Miguel and Gugerty
(2005), Fernandez and Levy (2008), see Alesina and Ferrara (2005) and Costa and Kahn (2003) for
a comprehensive review of literature). In general, these other studies postulate that di¤erent ethnic
groups, for diverse reasons, nd it di¢ cult to cooperate in order to induce and/or enforce optimal
economic policies. But the evidence on this is mixed. Using rm-level data, Ellison and Mullin
(2014) show that more heterogeneous o¢ ces in a rm enjoy less social goods such as cooperation
and satisfaction, but perform better than those that are more homogeneous. By proposing a new
9See, e.g., Barro and McCleary (2003, 2005), Blum and Dudley (2001), Guiso, Sapienza and Zingales (2003, 2006),
George Becker (1997), Glaeser and Sacerdote (2008), Goldin and Katz (2000), Glaeser and Glendon (1998), Sascha
Becker and Ludger Woessmann (2009).
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mechanism through which group and ethnic fragmentation a¤ects human capital "demand", we view
our theoretical and empirical ndings as complementary to the existing body of research, which, unlike
our study, has essentially focused on the e¤ect of ethnic fragmentation on the "supply" of public goods.
To our knowledge, our study is the rst to document theoretically and empirically the e¤ect of ethnic
fragmentation on the "demand" for schooling.
3 The Model
3.1 Setup
Consider a discrete-time innite sequence of generations where each generation lives for two periods,
being active in the rst period of existence and inactive in the second period. Let the active population
each period be referred to as the current cohort and the inactive population as the older cohort.
This population is of unit mass and indexed in the [0; 1] interval. Let there be two ethnic groups
which are referred to as ethnic group 1 and ethnic group 2.10 The size of ethnic group 1 is c and that
of ethnic group 2 is 1   c. For ease of notation, ethnic group i 2 f1; 2g is said to have size ci. In
each period, each individual of the current cohort is matched to an inactive individual from the same
ethnicity (e.g., a parent).
Each individual in the current cohort chooses his investment in either human capital or ethnic
capital. Investing in human capital means that an individual gets a formal education and is able to
participate in the formal labor market. The formal labor market is such that the returns to participants
depend on all others (not necessarily from the same ethnicity) also participating in this market. On
the other hand, an investment in ethnic capital means that the individual gets traditional/ethnic
education and is eligible only to participate in the ethnic labor market. The ethnic labor market is
such that the only participants are members of the same ethnic group who also choose ethnic capital.11
Ethnic labor markets in Nigeria arise due to ethnic groups focusing on certain businesses and
trades; and investment in ethnic capital can be thought of as joining an apprentice system to learn
the business/trade. A prominent feature of Igbo businesses, located in Nigerias large and medium
urban centers, is the phenomenon of apprenticeship. Chukwuezi (2001) shows that career trajectories
of majority of Igbo businessmen started o¤ as apprentices, and that pattern still remains. Through
kinship relations, masters recruit apprentices. After serving an agreed period, the apprentice is given
cash, or a specied quantity of trading goods, or both, with which to begin own business. In time, and
after establishing the business, the new master will in turn recruit apprentices as assistants primarily
from among kin. Thus, kinship links urban business success to labor recruitment from rural home base
for Igbo businesses and to manpower training for Igbo society (Chukwuezi, 2001). There is also the
10We use the phrase "ethnic group" for simplicity. It is meant to designate a religious group or an ethno-religious
group (e.g., Yoruba Muslims) too. We also note that we assume two groups for clarity in the exposition. Assuming n
groups will not change our results qualitatively.
11 In this paper, ethnic capital is viewed as competing with human capital for an individuals time endowment. We are
therefore not interested in those forms of ethnic capital that instead facilitate the acquisition of human capital. In fact,
those forms of ethnic capital could be viewed as human capital too.
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issue of Muslim Northerners concentrating on foreign currency exchange businesses across the country.
These businesses are so prevalent that Hausa quarters, as their areas of residence are called, in most
cities are places where locals go to buy and sell foreign currencies and often those are not registered
Bureau De Change. Note that the important distinction between the ethnic labor market and the
formal labor market is that the former is accessible only to those from the same ethnic group whereas
the latter is accessible without discrimination to all those who invested in human capital.
Let a fraction hit from ethnic group i invest in human capital and a fraction 1 hit invest in ethnic
capital. The benet from either form of investment is given by the wages earned. The total level of
human capital in the economy is denoted by ht:
ht = h1tc+ h2t(1  c) (1)
The production function for the formal labor market depends on the total level of human capital in
the economy and is given by a well-behaved function f(ht). To keep the model uncluttered, we do not
explicitly model capital for this sector. Wages in the formal labor market are equated to the marginal
product of labor given by the function w(ht). The maximum attainable value for w(ht) is denoted w,
and its minimum attainable value w. It is assumed that the production function exhibits diminishing
marginal returns to scale and that wages are strictly positive. These assumptions are summarized
below:
 A1 The wage function, w(ht), is continuous and strictly decreasing in ht. Further, w(h) >
0 for any h > 0.
The production function for the ethnic labor market of the ethnic group i is given by g(i; (1  
hit)ci), where (1  hit)ci measures the total investment in ethnic capital by the current cohort of the
ethnic group and i denotes the assets available to ethnic community i for use in the ethnic production
function. The variable i is called the ethnic wealth. Ethnic wealth can be interpreted as actual wealth
used in the production of goods and services by the ethnic community, or, more broadly, as including
the cultural factors which make the ethnic wage more valuable. The two groups may have di¤erent
levels of ethnic wealth which indicates di¤erent incentives for members of the two groups to invest in
ethnic capital. The implied wages for ethnic group i is given by we(i; (1  hit)ci). We again assume
that this production function exhibits diminishing marginal returns to scale with respect to the labor
input. On the other hand, the ethnic wage is assumed to be increasing in the level of ethnic wealth.
These assumptions are summarized below:
 A2 The ethnic wage function, we(i; (1   hit)ci), is continuous in both arguments, strictly in-
creasing in i, and strictly decreasing in (1  hit).
The relative cost of human capital investment depends on the ability of the individual as well as
the size of his ethnic groups older cohort which invested in human capital.12 We assume that the
12Child ability can be proxied by parental ability which is measured by parental wealth and education.
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ethnic capital formation costs nothing while the cost of human capital formation is given by c(a; hit 1),
where a 2 [0; 1] denotes the ability of the individual and hit 1 denotes the human capital investment
by the older cohort of ethnic group i. Note that the assumption of ethnic capital formation costs being
zero is purely cosmetic since c(a; hit 1) is being interpreted as the relative cost of acquiring human
capital. We assume that:
 A3 Ability, a, is distributed in both groups according to the same distribution function G(a)
and this distribution is invertible.
 A4 The cost function, c(a; hit 1), is continuous and decreasing in both its inputs.
Assumption A3 says that the two groups do not di¤er with regard to the distribution of ability.
This assumption ensures that ex-post di¤erences in human capital investment are not driven by dif-
ferences in ability across ethnic groups and so that attention can be focused on the other actionable
drivers of group di¤erences. It is in line with Lourys (2002) axiom of anti-essentialism. Assumption
A4 says that the cost of human capital formation is decreasing in both the ability of the individual as
well as in the investment in human capital by the older cohort of the individuals ethnic group. This
assumption is based on the fact that a child who is helped in his homework by his educated parents or
by the older members of his ethnic group learns faster, meaning that the human capital of his parents
and ethnic community decreases his cost of learning or of acquiring human capital.
Given the wage functions w(:) and we(:; :) and the cost function c(:; :), the economy is described
by E = fc; (1; h10); (2; h20)g. The following lemma then automatically follows from the assumptions.
Lemma 1 Let E be an economy satisfying assumptions A1-A4. For each ethnic group i in period
t, there exists a threshold ability ait such that all individuals in group i with ability greater than ait
choose to invest in human capital.
The lemma holds because the cost of acquiring human capital is decreasing in ability and the stock
of human capital of the older cohort is the same for all members of an ethnic group. If hit is the
equilibrium level of human capital in period t of ethnic group i, then it must be that:
ait = G
 1(1  hit) (2)
Note that, in equilibrium, ait (and hence hit) depends on the benet of investing in human versus
ethnic capital given by the following function:
b(hit; hjt; i; hit 1) = w(hitci + hjt(1  ci))  we(i; (1  hit)ci)  c(G 1(1  hit); hit 1) (3)
Hence, for any xed value of human capital investment by ethnic group j, say hjt, it must be that the
optimal proportion of ethnic group i that invests in human capital is given by the implicit function
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h(hjt; i; hit 1) such that:
h(hjt; i; hit 1) =
8><>:
0 if b(hit; hjt; i; hit 1) < 0 8hit 2 [0; 1]
hit s.t. b(hit; hjt; i; hit 1) = 0
1 if b(hit; hjt; i; hit 1) > 0 8hi 2 [0; 1]
(4)
It follows that the function h(hjt; i; hit 1) gives the level of human capital investment at which the
di¤erential wage from human capital over wage from ethnic capital equals the cost of human capital
investment or it must be that for all values of hi, the cost c(G 1(1 hit); hit 1) is always greater (resp.
less) than the wage di¤erential w(ht)   we(i; (1   hit)ci), in which case it must be that the optimal
level of human capital investment is hit = 0 (resp. hit = 1).
The competitive equilibrium path for any economy E is given by the pair fh1t; h2tg1t=1 such
that:
h1t = h(h

2t; 1; h1t 1) (5)
h2t = h(h

1t; 2; h2t 1) (6)
A competitive equilibrium path is a steady state if (h1t; h2t) = (h10; h20) for all periods t. The
steady state levels of human capital are denoted by (h1; h2).
3.2 Main Results
3.2.1 Existence and Multiplicity of Equilibria
The following result proves the existence of a competitive equilibrium path for any economy E .
Theorem 1 For any economy E, given assumptions A1-A4, there exists a competitive equilibrium
path.
Proof. Given assumptions A1-A4, suppose that at some time t the human capital investment
by the older cohort, (h1t 1; h2t 1), is given. Then the theorem says that there must exist (h1t; h2t)
as dened by Equations 5 and 6. If the level of human capital investment by group 2 is xed at h2t,
let h(h2t; 1; h1t 1) capture the optimal level of human capital investment by group 1 as dened in
Equation 4. Note that:
 w(ht)  we(1; (1  h1t)c1) is continuous and strictly decreasing in h1t given a xed h2; and
 c(G 1(1  h1t); h1t 1) is continuous and increasing in h1t.
Hence, there exists a unique h1t such that Equation 4 is satised, which implies that the function
h(h2t; 1; h1t 1) is decreasing and continuous in h2t. This is true because as h2t increases, the wage
di¤erential w(ht)   we(1; (1   h1t)c1) falls for all h1t while the cost of human capital acquisition
remains unchanged. The continuity of the function h(h2t; 1; h1t 1) follows from the fact that the
assumptions imply that the benet function given in Equation 3 is continuous in all its arguments.
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Given that group 2 faces a similar situation as group 1 with the same wage and cost functions, let
h(h1t; 2; h2t 1) be the function that captures the optimal level of human capital investment by group
2. Since both these functions are continuous and are mappings from a compact, convex set onto itself,
by the Brouwer xed point theorem, an equilibrium given by (h1t; h2t) must exist such that Equations
5 and 6 are satised.
The next proposition looks at the possibility of multiple steady states. Note that the steady states
of an economy are determined based on the variables c, 1, and 2. It is shown that even if groups
are identical ex-ante, a unique symmetric equilibrium is not guaranteed. In particular, asymmetric
equilibria exist where the groups choose very di¤erent levels of human capital investment.
Proposition 1 Let E be an economy where the two groups are ex-ante identical in size and in the
level of ethnic wealth. Assume A1-A4. It is possible to have more than one steady state. Moreover,
steady state may be asymmetric, where h1 6= h2.
Proof. We prove by example. Assume that:
 w(ht) = 3 h1t h2t. Note that this function is decreasing in the total human capital investment
by the two ethnic groups. The minimum wage is 1 and the maximum wage is 3.
 we(i; hit) = i   (1   hit)2. The two ethnic groups have the same level of ethnic wealth, and
suppose 1 = 2 = 2. The ethnic wage function is then exactly the same for the two groups. Note
that this wage is decreasing in investment in ethnic capital, which is (1   hit). The minimum
ethnic wage is 1 while the maximum is 2.
 c(a; hit 1) = 2   a   (hit 1). Assume that ability is 1 for all individuals. Then c(a; hit 1) =
1  hit 1.
Given the above, at a steady state where human capital investment is constant over time, the
benet of human capital investment by each group for a xed level of human capital investment by
the other group is given by the functions:
b(h1; h2; 1) = 1  h2   2h1 + h21 (7)
b(h2; h1; 2) = 1  h1   2h2 + h22 (8)
Using Equations 7 and 8, we can see that there are three possible steady state levels of human
capital investment given by (h1 = 1; h2 = 0), (h1 = 0; h2 = 1) and (h1 = :38; h2 = :38).
The following proposition says that even when two ethnic groups di¤er in human capital investment,
the di¤erence is more pronounced among their low-ability members.
Proposition 2 Let E be an economy satisfying assumptions A1-A4. Every period t, there exists an
ability threshold t such that all individuals in each group i 2 f1; 2g with ability greater than t choose
to invest in human capital.
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Proof. The proof follows directly from Lemma 1. In fact, let t = maxfa1t; a2tg. Given that all
individuals in each group i 2 f1; 2g with ability greater than t have ability above the group-specic
threshold ait, it immediately follows from Lemma 1 that all such individuals choose to invest in human
capital.
It is important to notice that Proposition 2 does not say that t is smaller than 1. If t is equal
to 1, then, even with two ex-ante identical groups, it might be the case that all the members of one
group choose human capital and all the members of the other group choose ethnic capital, even if all
members have very high ability. But if t is smaller than 1, then Proposition 2 implies that even if
two groups di¤er in human capital investment, members of both groups with ability greater than t
will all invest in human capital, also implying that the di¤erence only occurs among members whose
ability falls below t.
3.2.2 Impacts of Ethnic Wealth and Older Cohorts Human Capital
The next result shows that the human capital investment of the older cohort positively a¤ects the
human capital investment of the current cohort, holding xed the level of ethnic wealth.
Proposition 3 Let E be an economy satisfying assumptions A1-A4. Assume that the two groups
have the same level of ethnic wealth (1 = 2 = ) but di¤er in the initial level of human capital
investment (hi0 < hj0). Then any competitive equilibrium path fh1t; h2tg1t=1 is such that hit  hjt 8t.
Proof. Without loss of generality, suppose that h1t 1 < h2t 1. In this case, it must be that for
any given ability level a, c(a; h1t 1) > c(a; h2t 1). Clearly, for the Equations 5 and 6 to hold, it must
be that h1t  h2t. Or the group starting with the lower level of human capital must have lower human
capital all along an equilibrium path.
The following result shows how the level of ethnic wealth a¤ects human capital investment when
all other variables are kept constant across the two groups. It is shown that, for groups with the same
level of human capital investment of the older cohort, human capital investment is higher for the group
with the lower ethnic wealth.
Proposition 4 Let E be an economy satisfying assumptions A1-A4. Assume that the two groups
have the same initial level of human capital investment, hi0 = hj0, but di¤er in the level of ethnic
wealth (i < j). Then along any competitive equilibrium path given by fh1t; h2tg1t=1, it must be that
hit  hjt 8t.
Proof. Suppose, without loss of generality, that 1 > 2. In this case, for any given ability level
a, the cost of human capital acquisition is the same for the two ethnic groups. Since 1 > 2, if in
any period t, both groups are such that the same proportion h of their members invest in human
capital, then the wage di¤erential from investing in human capital versus ethnic capital will be greater
for group 2. And hence in any time t along a competitive equilibrium path, it must be that group
2 invests more in human capital than group 1 unless group 1 is such that all members of the group
invest in human capital.
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3.2.3 Impact of Ethnic Group Size
The next result highlights the fact that members of ethnic groups with very little ethnic wealth always
choose to invest in human capital. We then study the implications of this result when ethnic wealth is
assumed to be proportional to the size of the ethnic groups population. This assumption is plausible
in ethnic democracies such as the ones prevailing in African countries, where the political power of a
group, and so its ability to extract rents to be shared among its members, is positively a¤ected by its
size. We make the following additional assumptions:
 A5 we(0; :) = 0.
 A6 w > c(0; 0).
Assumption A5 ensures that in the case there is no ethnic wealth, the wages from ethnic labor
market must be zero. Assumption A6 is equivalent to saying that, in the case where the ethnic wages
are zero, then all individuals, including those with the least ability and belonging to a group where no
one from the older cohort invested in human capital, prefer to invest in human capital. Hence, when
investment in ethnic capital is not a feasible alternative, then the individual always invests in human
capital.
Proposition 5 Let E be an economy satisfying assumptions A1-A6. The following assertions are
correct at all times along a competitive equilibrium path:
1. The members of a group with low enough ethnic wealth always choose to invest in human capital.
2. If the ethnic wealth is proportional to the size of the ethnic group, then su¢ ciently small groups
will invest only in human capital.
3. Suppose there are n ethnic groups such that the i-th group is of size ci = 1n and its investment in
human capital at time t is given by hit. The total human capital is given by ht =
Pn
i=1 hit. If the
ethnic wealth is proportional the size of the ethnic group, then su¢ ciently increasing the number
of ethnic groups leads to all individuals investing in human capital. In other words, ethnic and
group fragmentation increases investment in human capital.
Proof. 1) It is claimed that there exists a level of ethnic wealth   0 such that any individual
belonging to an ethnic group i whose wealth is below  always chooses to invest in human capital.
Formally,  must be such that even when the the older cohort has no human capital and the wage from
human capital is the lowest, all the members of the ethnic group choose to invest in human capital:
w   we(; 0)  c(0; 0) (9)
There must exist some such  because it is known that we(:; :) is continuously increasing in ethnic
wealth, we(0; :) = 0, and w > c(0; 0).
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2) Suppose that the size of ethnic wealth depends on the size of the ethnic group, and in particular
suppose that 1 = c   and 2 = (1   c)  . In this case, if c is such that c   = , then it must be
that, if the ethnic groups size is less than c, then all the members of the ethnic group invest in human
capital.
3) Suppose that there are n equally sized ethnic groups and that ethnic wealth is proportional to
ethnic size: i = 1n where  is some xed constant. If n is the number of groups such that
1
n  ,
then if the number of groups is greater than n, then all the members of each group will invest in
human capital.
The results stated above intuitively come from the fact that low ethnic wealth implies low wages
from ethnic capital, and if these wages are much lower than the least wage possible from investing
in human capital, then members of groups with low ethnic wealth will not choose to invest in ethnic
capital.
3.2.4 Allowing for Cross-Ethnic Interactions in Human Capital
We now modify the model to allow for interactions across ethnic groups. In particular, suppose that
all times, each individuals cost of acquiring human capital depends not only on the human capital
acquisition by the older cohort of his group, but also on the human capital of the older cohort of the
other group. Further, let  measure the relative importance of his own ethnic group such that, for an
individual from group i with ability a at time t, the cost of human capital is c(a; hit 1+(1 )hjt 1).
Without loss of generality, for the rest of this section, we assume that the two groups are of equal size
and in that case,  = 0:5 is a situation of perfect assimilation. However, as  approaches 1, the
model reverts to the one without cross-ethnic interactions. Given the above, the interesting cases of 
are where it is in the range [:5; 1] where it varies from perfect assimilation to none. With cross-ethnic
interactions, the benet function capturing the di¤erence between the wage di¤erential and the cost
of acquiring human capital must be:
b(hit; hjt; i; hit 1 + (1  )hjt 1) = w(ht)  we(i; 1  hit)
  c(G 1(1  hit); hit 1 + (1  )hjt 1) (10)
Given the benet function, for any xed value of human capital investment by ethnic group j, say
hjt, it must be that the optimal proportion of ethnic group i that invests in human capital is given by
the function h(hjt; i; hit 1 + (1   )hjt 1) as dened in Equation 4. Moreover, using the changed
denition of the older cohort human capital, the competitive equilibrium path for any economy E is
given by the pair fh1t; h2tg1t=1 such that:
h1t = h(h

2t; 1; h1t 1 + (1  )h2t 1) (11)
h2t = h(h

1t; 2; h2t 1 + (1  )h1t 1) (12)
The next proposition delves into the impact of changing . It assumes inelastic wages such that
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attention can be focussed on the impact of the segregation parameter, . Then it shows that, assuming
the competitive equilibrium path is unique, it must be that the di¤erence in the human capital acquired
by the two groups is increasing in . Or the di¤erence in human capital attainment increases as society
becomes more segregated.
Proposition 6 In an economy E with cross-ethnic interactions, given assumptions A1-A4, let wages
in the formal labor market and in the two ethnic labor markets be inelastic w.r.t. the labor supply in
each market. Then at each time along the competitive equilibrium path, the di¤erence in the human
capital investment by the ethnic groups is increasing in .
Proof. At time t, suppose the human capital investment by the older cohort is such that h1t 1 
h2t 1. Then the proposition says that there must exist (h1t; h2t) as dened by Equations 11 and 12
such that the di¤erence jh1t   h2tj is increasing in .
Let wages in the formal labor market be xed and given by w. Similarly, let the wages in the ethnic
labor market be xed and given by we for both ethnic groups. Ethnic group is level of investment
in human capital will be such that it equalizes the wage gap given by w   we to the cost of acquiring
human capital. Note that the cost of acquiring human capital is such that:
 c(G 1(1  h1t); h1t 1 + (1  )h2t 1) is continuous and decreasing in ;
 c(G 1(1  h2t); h2t 1 + (1  )h1t 1) is continuous and increasing in .
Hence, the function h1t is increasing in . This is true because an increase in  leads to an increase
in the human capital of the older cohort for members of group 1. This then leads to a lower cost of
human capital at all ability levels. Hence, the level of current human capital, which equates the wage
di¤erential to the cost of acquiring human capital, must increase as  increases. On the other hand,
for group 2, an increase in  leads to a decrease in the human capital of the older cohort. Hence
following a similar reasoning, h2t must decrease as  increases. In other words, as  increases, so does
the gap between the human capital acquisitions by the two groups.
The next proposition shows that even perfect assimilation does not assure that there is no di¤erence
in the human capital acquired by the two groups. When  = 0:5, both groups di¤er only by the level
of their ethnic wealth. And hence, the only reason for varying human capital investment must be due
to di¤ering levels of ethnic wealth. The following result presents an extension of the results given in
Proposition 4. It shows that even for perfectly assimilated groups, human capital investment is higher
for the group with the lower ethnic wealth.
Proposition 7 In an economy E with cross-ethnic interactions, given assumptions A1-A4, if the two
groups are perfectly assimilated ( = :5) but the level of ethnic wealth is such that i < j, then along
any competitive equilibrium path of human capital investment given by fh1t; h2tg1t=1, it must be that
hit  hjt 8t.
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Proof. Without loss of generality, suppose that 1 > 2. In this case, since  = :5, it must be
that for any given ability level a, the cost of human capital acquisition is the same for the two ethnic
groups. Since 1 > 2, if both groups were such that at any time t, the same proportion ht from
each group invests in human capital, then the wage di¤erential from investing in human capital versus
ethnic capital would be greater for group 2. And hence on the equilibrium path, it must be that group
2 invests more in human capital than group 1 unless group 1 is such that all its members invest in
human capital.
3.3 Testable Implications
Our ndings in the previous section clearly shows that the demand for human capital by an individual
is a¤ected positively by his ability (which we will measure by parental wealth and education) and
his groups older cohorts human capital, and negatively by his groups size. We empirically test the
following predictions of the model.
T1. Two groups that are ex-ante identical may di¤er in human capital accumulation (Proposition 1).
T2. If two groups di¤er in human capital accumulation, this di¤erence mostly occurs among the
low-ability members of both groups (Proposition 2).
T3. A persons demand for human capital is positively a¤ected by his groups older cohorts human
capital (Proposition 3).
T4. A persons demand for human capital is negatively a¤ected by his groups size (Propositions 4, 5
(item 2), and 7).
T5. Ethnic and group fragmentation positively a¤ects the demand for human capital (item 3 of
Proposition 5).
Our rst prediction (T1) comes from Proposition 1 showing that asymmetric equilibrium outcomes
may emerge out of ex-ante identical initial conditions. The empirical implications of this prediction
are profound. One implication is that group di¤erences in human capital do not mean that one group
is on average smarter than the other. The other implication is that, in a multivariate regression of
human capital on group identity (or group membership), group di¤erences may not disappear after
all "imaginable" controls are included.
The second prediction (T2) comes from the fact that high-ability individuals always invest in
human capital regardless of their groups characteristics. It follows that, if two groups di¤er in human
accumulation, the di¤erence should be concentrated among their low-ability members. This prediction
can be tested by estimating group di¤erences in educational attainment across di¤erent levels of
parental ability. If the prediction is correct, smaller group di¤erences in educational attainment should
be seen among children whose parents have a high level of education or wealth.
Our third prediction (T3) has some implications for the intergenerational transmission of human
capital. In the context of Nigeria, it also implies that members of ethnic groups that were historically
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exposed to Christian missionary activity should fare better than those whose ancestors were only
exposed to Islam. This is because Christian missionaries introduced formal education, and so ethnic
groups that were exposed to missionary activity acquired education earlier, and became more educated
than members of groups that were not exposed. Following Proposition 3, this initial di¤erence was
transmitted to the following cohort, and so on till the present day.
Applying the fourth prediction (T4) to Nigeria partly tells us why smaller ethnic groups, such
as the Igbo, have more human capital than larger groups, such as the Hausa/Fulani/Kanuri. The
Hausa/Fulani/Kanuri people are culturally homogeneous, and have served as the main constituency
of political leaders from northern Nigeria. Their large size partly explains why 9 of the 15 Heads of
State that Nigeria has had since its independence have come from the North. Having been in power
for so many years compared to other ethnic groups, they have had the opportunity to extract more
rents, increasing their ethnic wealth and decreasing their incentives to invest in human capital.
Prediction (T4) also implies that ethnic groups that are more spatially dispersed invest more in
human capital than groups that are more concentrated, even holding ability distribution xed. In
fact, group dispersion leads to smaller subgroups, which leads to a greater demand for human capital.
The fth testable prediction (T5) directly follows from (T4), as fragmentation results in smaller
groups. It implies, for instance, that if an ethnic group is split by religion, their members will invest
more in human capital. This might explain why the Yoruba group, which is the religiously most
fragmented group, fares better than other ethnic groups at most ages. In the next section, we will test
each of these predictions of the model.
4 The Empirical Test
We test the predictions of the model using data from Nigeria, where ethnicity and religion have emerged
as the two most important dimensions of identity. We do not have any evidence that the specic ethnic
groups in the country promote or discourage formal education. However, religion is clearly a factor in
the decision of certain individuals to acquire education. In the next section, we briey document the
historical role of Christianity and Islam in the spread of formal and religious education in Nigeria.
4.1 Religion and Education in Nigeria: A Historical Perspective
Islam was spread and consolidated in most of what later became northern Nigeria by the Jihad of
Uthman Dan Fodio about 1804. Historical records show that the introduction of Islam was accompa-
nied by the spread of its own form of holistic education (Fafunwa (1974), Ajidagba (1998)). Islamic
education and Arabic learning were simultaneously taught in schools in the region. As a result of the
political and social inuence which Islam and Koranic learning conferred on those possessing it, many
rulers employed Islamic scholars as administrators and Islamic education was supported by northern
Nigerian leaders and Northern Region Ministry of Education. Unlike modern formal schools, Islamic
schools operate with an open-ended structure that allows each student to pursue an individual course
of study. There is no clear-cut division into primary, secondary and tertiary levels. There is no pro-
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gression from one class to another and from one level to another, with examination barriers erected
along the way. There are no age limits or rigid timetable with neatly timed periods for subjects
(Umar (2003), Abdurrahman and Canham (1978)). Islamic knowledge is acquired through a master-
disciple relationship sustained by face-to-face oral instructions that transmit spiritual guidance, moral
authority, piety and blessing (Mohammed and Khan (1981)).
Despite the perception of great spiritual value, one obvious potential disadvantage of this edu-
cational curriculum is its focus on Arabic, which is not the language of literature, instruction and
correspondence in Nigeria. Also, the transmission of spiritual and moral values is privileged over the
acquisition of other forms of knowledge and skills that are valued in a market economy (Suleiman
(1995), Sulaiman (2001), Okoye and Yau (1999)).
Western-type education was widely introduced in Nigeria following the arrival of Wesleyan Chris-
tian missionaries at Badagry in 1842. Although literary education in the 4Rs (reading, writing,
arithmetic and religion) was predominant, this new missionary education prepared the recipients for
new job opportunities, as teachers, church evangelists or pastors, clerks and interpreters. Emphasis
was also placed on character training. Most of the missions established primary schools and, initially,
little emphasis was given to secondary or tertiary education. But following pressure from inuential
church members, who were rich merchants and emigrants living in Lagos, the CMS Grammar School
was established in 1857 in Lagos.
Western-type education spread more quickly in the south than in the north of Nigeria in part
because of the skepticism of the Muslims with regards to the value of an education proposed by Chris-
tian missionaries. It is estimated that there were about 25,000 Koranic schools already in existence
in northern Nigeria in 1914. Thus, the spread of western-style education met sti¤ opposition except
among the indigenous peoples of the North Central geopolitical zone, where Christian missionaries did
succeed in establishing schools, at times in collaboration with Government. Abdulkarim (2010) links
the educational orientation of Muslim communities and their reluctance to embrace western-oriented
education to the belief that it was not supportive of Islamic education, and possibly actively tried to
destroy it. Consequently the phenomenon of educational dualism has been historically entrenched in
Nigeria (Umar (2003)).
Several scholars have argued that Koranic schools in northern Nigeria are an alternative to formal
education, and in fact represent an institutionalized resistance to it (see, e.g., Winters (1987), Koehl
(1983), Urwick (1984)). Bray (1981) identied Kano State, the largest Hausa/Fulani state in Nigeria,
as one of the states in which implementation of the 1976-1980 Universal Primary Education scheme
encountered the most di¢ culty, owing to the strength of the "rival" tradition of Koranic education
and to the low level of existing enrolment in "western-type" schools. A survey of 1,998 pastoral
Fulani reported that about half (50%) had Koranic education, forty percent had no education, and
only seven percent had either formal or both mainstream and Koranic education (Iro (2007)). In a
1993 nationwide survey, NISER (1997) recorded the widespread of Koranic education among ethnic
groups in northern Nigeria generally, and notably among Hausa/Fulani/Kanuri. The data shows that
23.5% of the Hausa/Fulani/Kanuri children aged 5-24 attended Koranic schools and this proportion
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constitutes 95% of youth of that age group who attended such schools throughout the country.
Recent changes have given rise to new Islamic schools called the madrasa, some of which o¤er a
modied national public school curriculum. Yet they di¤er in their fundamental institutional orienta-
tion. School administrators actively foster Islamic identity and awareness among students and teach-
ers through congressional prayers, images of the Islamic world, and Islamic dress for females (Umar
(2003)). While these features collectively create a distinctly Islamic atmosphere in these schools,
it is the curricular emphasis on Arabic and Islamic Studies that really shape their Islamic charac-
ter and orientation, and di¤erentiate them from both the old Islamic educational institutions and
Nigerias public schools. Among other goals, madrasa curriculum aims to foster Islamic identity and
consciousness with competencies in Arabic and Islamic studies to "equip students to orient their lives
in accordance with Sharia" (Umar (2003)), whereas the national curriculum aims at "self-realization,
better human relationship, individual and national e¢ ciency, e¤ective citizenship, national conscious-
ness, national unity, as well as towards social, cultural, economic, political, scientic and technological
progress" (Federal Government of Nigeria (1981)).
It follows that the varying distribution of religious beliefs and attitudes towards "western edu-
cation" across ethnic groups in Nigeria mostly reects di¤erences in historical exposure to Christian
and Islamic activities in this country. Nunn (2010) provides compelling empirical evidence for the
fact that the descendants of people that were exposed to European missionaries in Africa more likely
self-identify as Christian today, which shows that Christian beliefs and values were transmitted across
generations from parents to children until the present day.The same can be said about the intergener-
ational di¤usion of Islam.
4.2 Data
This study utilizes a sample of 30,746 male and female individuals aged 5-24, pooled from the 1999
and 2003 Nigeria Demographic and Health Surveys. They are nationally representative, and were
designed to provide representative estimates of population and health indicators for all regions and
ethnic groups of the country. They used a two-stage probabilistic sampling technique to select clusters
(or neighborhoods) at the rst stage and households at the second stage. Clusters were selected from
each of the 36 States that the country has, and from the capital city. The surveys used household ques-
tionnaires to obtain information on members of a household, housing characteristics including living
facilities, household composition, and place and region of residence. The individual questionnaires for
males and females provided information on demographic, socioeconomic and cultural characteristics
including gender, age, education, marital status, migration status, religion, and ethnicity.
The outcome variable we analyze is the number of years of education acquired. Our main inde-
pendent variable is ethnicity (or membership in a tribe). The DHS data provide information on 113
ethnic groups. In this study, we borrow from the NISER (1997) classication and aggregate these
groups into ve major categories: the Hausa/Fulani/Kanuri of the core North, the Igbo of the South
East, the Yoruba of the South West, the Isoko/Urhobo/Edo/Ijaw/Ek/Ibibio of the Niger-Delta re-
gion and the Tiv/Igala/Idoma/Gwari of the Central region, also known as the Middle-Belt. There
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was a mixture of other groups that do not t into these core groups. This mixture is labeled in this
study as "Other ethnicity". It is important to note that, except for the category "Other ethnicity",
these groupings represent the best approximation of distinct cultural identities in Nigeria, mirroring
geographical, economic, political and religious enclaves (NISER (1997)). A similar classication is
followed in most studies on Nigeria (see, e.g., Osili (2007), Uwaifo (2008)).
In order to explain cross-ethnic di¤erences in educational attainment, we control for a range of
individual, household and neighborhood level variables, the details of which are presented in Table 1.
These factors are inspired by the vast literature on human capital, and they measure various inputs
into education. Their levels are likely to vary across ethnic groups. The individual level variables
are child gender, age and relationship to the household head. The inclusion of the latter variable
could be explained by the fact that parents may tend to invest more in biological children, but kinship
obligations vary across ethnic groups, and some groups may tend to di¤erentiate less between biological
and non-biological children. The household level factors controlled for are the characteristics of the
household head (gender, age, education and religion), as well as household wealth per capita.13 We
also control for neighborhood xed e¤ect, therefore taking into account all community-level variables.
We further control for minority status. An individual is in the minority group if he belongs to the
minority religion within his ethnic group. The variable for minority status takes the value of 1 if an
individual is a Muslim Igbo, Muslim Yoruba, Muslim Niger-Delta, Muslim Middle-Belt, or Christian
Hausa/Fulani/Kanuri, and takes the value 0 otherwise.
4.3 Empirical Results
4.3.1 Cross-Ethnic Di¤erences in Educational Attainment: Multiplicity of Equilibria
We test our rst two prediction (T1) regarding cross-ethnic di¤erences in educational attainment. We
use ordinary least squares to estimate a regression-based model of the form:
Educir = Ethnicityi+X + r + "ir (E1)
where Educir is the number of years of education attained by a person i living in a neighbor-
dhood r, and Ethnicityi a vector of ve binary indicators for ethnic groups Hausa/Fulani/Kanuri,
Igbo, Niger-Delta, Middle-Belt, and "Other ethnicity". The Yoruba ethnic group is the reference
group. X is a vector of variables including individual, household and neighborhood level variables.
The term r captures the neighborhood xed e¤ect, and "ir is the individual random e¤ect. The
vector of coe¢ cients  represents the main parameters of interest. Because of di¤erential supply of
education across neighborhoods and the possible correlation between neighborhood and ethnicity (i.e.
E(rEthnicityi) 6= 0), we estimate neighborhood xed e¤ects. This ensures that the supply of educa-
tion is similar for all individuals living in the same neighborhood. We also control for minority status.
13Household wealth is an asset-based index. It is constructed based on possession of assets such as the physical
quality of the home (materials for roof, wall, and oor), means of personal transportation (bicycle, motorcycle, car),
and household durables (radio, TV, video, electricity, piped water, etc.). We construct this index using the principal
component analysis (Filmer and Pritchett (2001), Montogomery et al. (2000)). We then divide it by the number of
household members.
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In fact, the supply of educational institutions being the same for all individuals within a neighbor-
hood might not not ensure that the access is the same for all. Maybe the dominant ethnic group has
an advantage in access to schools over the ethnic minorities. This may be especially relevant where
(good) schools are in short supply. Controlling for minority status in addition to neighborhood xed
e¤ects ensures that  only estimates di¤erences in the demand for education. Importantly, ethnicity
(or tribe), like race, is not a choice variable. Membership in a tribe is by ancestry or by birth. For
this reason, ethnicity precedes educational investment, which also implies that it is exogenous with
respect to the latter variable.14 It follows that all observed and unobserved variables that may be
correlated with ethnicity and educational attainment mediate rather than confound the e¤ect of the
former variable on the latter.15
After controlling for a range of individual, household and neighborhood level characteristics, we
argue that the remaining di¤erences in educational attainment across ethnic groups is consistent with
prediction (T1) according to which di¤erent ex-ante identical ethnic groups may nd themselves in
di¤erent educational equilibria. Consistent with our theoretical analysis, persistent group di¤erences in
educational attainment allow to identify ethnic groups that invest more in ethnic capital in equilibrium,
as human capital competes with ethnic capital for an individuals time endowment.
The results are presented in Table 2. Standard errors are clustered at the neighborhood level in all
of our regression-based analyses. We note substantial di¤erences in educational attainment between
ethnic groups. Column (I), which includes only the ethnicity dummies and a binary indicator for the
year 2003, shows that Igbo, Niger-Delta, Middle-Belt and Hausa/Fulani/Kanuri children lag behind
their Yoruba counterparts by an average of 0.49, 0.42, 1.81 and 4.05 years of education, respectively.
In subsequent columns (Columns (II)-(VI)), we control for a range of factors to determine how much of
these di¤erences can be explained by the data. Column (II) controls for child characteristics including
age and its quadratic term, gender, and relationship with the household head, as well as a dummy
indicator for Muslim. We nd that the relative disadvantage of Middle-Belt and Hausa/Fulani/Kanuri
children over Yoruba children falls, whereas the advantage of the latter over other ethnic groups
increases. In results not shown, controlling for child characteristics only do not signicantly a¤ect the
coe¢ cients found in Column (I), which implies that cross-group di¤erences in educational attainment
are not explained by child factors. The changes in the coe¢ cients noted in Column (II) are therefore
mainly explained by religion, which also has an independent e¤ect. In this respect, we note that
Muslims lag behind Christians by an average of 1.09 years of education.
In Column (III), we additionally control for household characteristics including the household
heads age and its quadratic term, gender, education and religion, as well as place of residence and
household wealth. Controlling for parental wealth and education (the variables measuring ability or
capability in our theoretical model) in particular is consistent with studies that have shown a causal
14Most studies consider ethnicity and race as exogenous with respect to educational achievement (e.g., Fryer and Levitt
(2004)).
15 In other words, these observed and unobserved factors that are associated with both ethnicity and education do not
"cause" ethnicity. Technically, these factors therefore can only be viewed as explaining the association between ethnicity
and education.
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impact of these variables on child education (see, e.g., Black, Devereux and Salvanes (2005)). The
estimates show that the Hausa/Fulani/Kanuri children now lag behind the Yoruba children by only 1.6
years of education. When comparing this coe¢ cient to that of Column (I), we estimate that over 60% of
the education gap between the two groups can be explained by the relative socioeconomic disadvantage
of the Hausa/Fulani/Kanuri children and by religious factors. Most of these factors, including parental
education, are intergenerational factors. We also note that the relative disadvantage of the Middle-Belt
children compared to their Yoruba counterparts decreases by almost 50%. However, the gap between
the Yoruba and the other groups (Igbo, Niger-Delta) continues to grow. In Column (IV), we control
for state xed e¤ects, and the relative advantage of the Yoruba over each of the other ethnic groups
decreases, but remains statistically signicant.
We now seek to determine whether the remaining di¤erences could be explained by the supply
of education, as this might vary across neighborhoods within a state. Since we do not have data on
the supply of education, as already noted, we control for neighborhood xed e¤ects (Column (V)),
relying on the assumption that individuals residing within the same neighborhood likely enjoy access
to the same educational infrastructure supplied by the federal government, the state or any other
organization. We nd that the advantage of Yoruba children over their counterparts from other ethnic
groups declines in magnitude and statistical signicance. Indeed, the Igbo and Niger-Delta children are
no longer lagging behind (Column (V)). However, the Middle-Belt and Hausa/Fulani/Kanuri children
are still trailing their Yoruba counterparts by 0.65 and 0.96 years of education, respectively.
Although the supply of educational infrastructure is the same for all individuals within a neighbor-
hood, as mentioned earlier, the dominant ethnic group might have an advantage in access to schools.
For this reason, in Column (VI), we control for minority status. The relative disadvantage of the
Middle-Belt increases, but that of the Hausa/Fulani/Kanuri decreases, but remains statistically sig-
nicant. That these groups continue to lag behind after controlling for neighborhood xed e¤ect,
minority status, and a wide range of individidual and household variables strongly suggests that a
lower demand for (rather than a limited supply of) education explains their poor performance.
The cost of formal education might prevent members of certain groups from enrolling in school.
To address this issue, we exploit the fact that enrollment in public primary schools was declared free
in Nigeria in 1999. This measure most likely impacted younger individuals. We therefore estimate the
e¤ect of ethnicity on education for distinct age groups. In Table 3, we replicate the analysis of Table 2
for four separate age groups: 5-9 years old, 10-14 years old, 15-19 years old, and 20-24 years old. For
each age group, Column (I) controls only for ethnicity, and Column (II) controls for all the variables in
Column (V) of Table 2. Qualitatively, the ndings do not di¤er much from those obtained in Table 2.
In all age groups, the advantage of Yoruba children over the Igbo and the Niger-Delta disappears when
all variables are controlled for (Columns (II)). Furthermore, the relative disadvantage of the Middle-
Belt children is only visible among the 10-14 and the 20-24 year olds. However, Hausa/Fulani/Kanuri
children consistently lag behind, with their distance to the Yoruba increasing with age.
We now seek to determine the level of education at which di¤erences in educational attainment
across ethnic groups are more salient. We re-estimate equation (E1) separately for primary, secondary
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and tertiary education as dependent variables. The results are shown in Table 4. For each outcome
variable, Column (I) only controls for ethnicity, and Column (II) controls for all the variables con-
trolled in Column (V) of Table 2 including neighborhood xed e¤ects. We nd that, in general, the
Middle-Belt and the Hausa/Fulani/Kanuri individuals lag behind their Yoruba counterparts at all
levels of education, conrming our results in Tables 2 and 3. The probability of having a primary
education is about 23 percentage points smaller for the Hausa/Fulani/Kanuri compared to the Yoruba.
This di¤erence falls to 7 percentage points when all factors are controlled for. The probability of hav-
ing a secondary education is about 12 and 30 percentage points smaller for the Middle-Belt and the
Hausa/Fulani/Kanuri compared to the Yoruba, but these di¤erences fall after all the other factors are
controlled for. The Hausa/Fulani/Kanuri and the Middle-Belt individuals continue to lag behind the
Yoruba at the tertiary level, but the relative disadvantage of the Hausa/Fulani/Kanuri becomes statis-
tically insignicant after controlling for other variables (this might be due to the fact that the number
of Hausa/Fulani/Kanuri individuals who have a university education is extremely small, representing
less than 0.6 percent of all the individuals aged 5-24 from this ethnic group).
Overall, the results validate prediction (T1) on the possibility of there being multiple equilib-
ria, with the Yoruba, the Igbo, the Niger-Delta, and to a certain extent the Middle-Belt being
in a di¤erent equilibrium compared to the Hausa/Fulani/Kanuri. The diverging outcome of the
Hausa/Fulani/Kanuri is consistent with the existence of an equilibrium in which certain individuals
in that group invest only in ethnic capital. Indeed, as argued in the introduction, Figure 4 supports
this view, as it shows that among the Hausa/Fulani/Kanuri, 23.5% of children have only a Koranic
education, in stark constrast to the Igbo (0.1%), the Niger-Delta (0.4%), the Middle-Belt (2.7%), and
the Yoruba (0.4%).16
4.3.2 Cross-Ethnic Di¤erences in Educational Attainment are Mostly Concentrated in
Individuals of Low Ability
In this section, we test prediction (T2) according to which cross-ethnic di¤erences in educational
attainment should be more pronounced among low-ability individuals due to the fact that individuals
of high ability choose human capital over ethnic capital, regardless of the degree of adherence of their
group to oppositional norms.
As already mentioned, we measure an individuals ability by the education of his households head
and by his households wealth. The results are presented in Tables 5 and 6. In Panel A of Table 5, we
regress education on ethnicity controlling for all relevant factors (including neighborhood xed e¤ects)
as in Column (V) of Table 2. In Column (I), we estimate this regression over the entire sample, but in
subsequent columns, the analysis is restricted to individuals whose parents have no education (Column
(II)), primary education (Column (III)), secondary education (Column (IV)), or university education
16 It is interesting to notice that so few Yoruba children invest exclusively in Koranic education in spite of the fact that
about half of them are Muslim. In general, we know that members of all groups invest in ethnic capital (for instance,
by attending weekly ethnic meetings and events). However, for all the groups except the Hausa/Fulani/Kanuri, most of
these events rarely compete with human capital investment for an individuals time endowment, as they are generally
organized during the weekend, that is outside of school hours.
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(Column (V)). We e¤ectively nd that cross-ethnic di¤erences in years of education attained are con-
centrated among children of low parental education. For instance, Hausa/Fulani/Kanuri individuals
lag behind their Yoruba counterparts by 1.7 years of education when parents have no education, and
by only 0.4 years of education when parents have a university education, with the latter e¤ect being
statistically insignicant. In general, cross-ethnic di¤erences in educational attainment become eco-
nomically smaller and in most cases lose their statistical signicance as parental education increases.
In Panel B, we replicate the analysis shown in Panel A for Muslim individuals only. This restriction
controls for common factors inherent in Islam, but at the same time, it allows for the fact that
adherence to Islamic norms and traditions may vary across ethnic groups in Nigeria. In general, we
nd no signicant cross-ethnic di¤erences in years of education attained for individuals whose parents
have at least a primary level education (the signicant advantage of Igbo children born to parents
with a university education over their Yoruba counterparts is an exception). Cross-ethnic di¤erences
in educational attainment are mostly pronounced among individuals whose parents have no education.
In Panel A of Table 6, we estimate cross-ethnic di¤erences in educational attainment across quintiles
of household wealth. We nd economically signicant di¤erences mostly among poor children (those
whose households fall in the rst and second wealth quintiles), and these di¤erences decrease as
household wealth increases. When we replicate this analysis for Muslim individuals only (Panel B),
the results are even stronger.17
In general, our ndings validate the prediction of the model that cross-ethnic di¤erences in edu-
cational attainment are smaller among individuals of higher ability, as these individuals more likely
choose human capital over ethnic capital regardless of their ethnic groupss adherence to opposi-
tional norms. The ndings are not driven by the di¤erential supply of formal education across ethnic
groups, as we control for neighborhood xed e¤ects. The results clearly suggest that among the
Hausa/Fulani/Kanuri, it is the low-ability children that invest only in Koranic education, whereas
children of comparable ability in other ethnic groups invest in formal education, clearly validating
(T2).
4.3.3 Groups Older Cohorts Human Capital Positively A¤ects the Demand for Formal
Education Regardless of Parental Ability
In this section, we test prediction (T3) that an individuals demand for human capital is positively
a¤ected by his ethnic groups older cohorts human capital regardless of the ability of his parents. We
measure the older cohorts human capital in an ethnic group by the proportion of adults (at least 25
years old) with at least a secondary or university level education in that group. As our observation
units are individuals aged 5-24 years, using the education of individuals aged at least 25 years to test
(T3) guarantees a certain degree of exogeneity of our predictor. It also allows us to avoid the reection
17We observe that there are no Muslim Igbo in the 1st, 2nd and 3rd wealth quintiles. The fact that Muslim Igbo
belong only to the richest quintiles is evidence supporting the proposition that when a distinct group is small in size, its
members tend to do better than when they belong to a large group, perhaps knowing ab-initio that their only abilities
will determine whether they succeed or perish as they will have little or no signicant amount of the social capital which
plays a crucial role in determining outcomes in a patronage-based society like Nigeria.
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problem, as children do not inuence the educational choices of adults, it is rather the contrary.
We estimate the following equation:
Educir = GroupAbilityir1 +GroupAbility ir2 + abilityi3 +X + r + "ir (E2)
where GroupAbilityir is the older cohorts human capital in the ethnic group of individual i in
neighborhood r; GroupAbility ir is a vector of variables, each of which represents the older cohorts
human capital in an ethnic group (to which i does not belong) in neighborhood r; abilityi is the ability
of individual is parents (measured by education and wealth); and X a range of other individual,
household, and neighborhood characteristics. We estimate Equation (E2) using the entire sample
rst, and then the subsample representing each ethnic group.
Our rst set of results is presented in Table 7. In each Column (I), we include our main predictor
and control for seven dichotomous indicators for the year 2003 and for whether an ethnic group is
represented in a neighborhood. In each Column (II), we additionally control for parental education
and wealth and other relevant factors as listed in Column (IV) of Table 2.
When estimates are based on the entire sample, we nd that the proportion of educated Igbo and
Hausa/Fulani/Kanuri adult individuals increases childrens education in general, while the proportion
of educated Yoruba, Niger-Delta and Middle-Belt individuals has the opposite e¤ect when all controls
are included. We now restrict the analysis to each ethnic group. In general, the share of educated
adults in an ethnic group has its largest positive e¤ect on the education of children belonging to that
ethnic group, and in some cases has a negative e¤ect on other ethnic groups. For instance, a one-
point increase in the share of educated Yoruba adults increases the education of Yoruba children by
1.7 years (Column (I)) and that of Hausa/Fulani/Kanuri children by 0.6 years, but has a negative
and statistically insignicant e¤ect on Igbo children. Similarly, a one-point increase in the share
of educated Igbo adults increases education among the Igbo children by 3 years (Column (I)), but
decreases education among the Hausa/Fulani/Kanuri children by 2.2 years, and has no e¤ect on other
ethnic groups. Likewise, a one-point increase in the share of educated Hausa/Fulani/Kanuri adults
increases education by 5.2 years among Hausa/Fulani/Kanuri children, but has little e¤ect on other
children. When controls are introduced (Column (II)), these e¤ects diminish, but do not qualitatively
change the results.
The results do not change qualitatively if we measure the older cohorts human capital by the share
of adults with a university level education (Table 8). We still see a strong network e¤ect according to
which the proportion of educated adult individuals in a group positively a¤ects educational attainment
in that group mostly.
In general, the ndings validate prediction (T3) of the model that an individual who belongs to an
ethnic group with a large proportion of educated older cohort is more likely to choose human capital
over ethnic capital regardless of the ability of his parents. Interestingly, we note that these e¤ects are
mostly conned within ethnic groups, as the proportion of educated adults in a given ethnic group
has little impact on children belonging to other ethnic groups in general. This result also provides
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evidence for the fact that ethnic groups in Nigeria are not "mutually" integrated.18
4.3.4 Minority Status and Educational Attainment
In this section and the next section, we test prediction (T4) that being in a smaller ethnic group
increases the demand for human capital. We regress educational attainment on a binary indicator
for being a minority individual and interaction terms between this latter variable and ethnicity. The
results are presented in Table 9. In Column (I), we only control for minority status, and nd that
being a minority individual is associated with over 0.9 more years of education. In Column (II), we
additionally control for ethnicity and all the other variables as in Column (V) of Table 2. The e¤ect of
minority decreases but remains economically and statistically signicant. In Column (III), we control
for the interaction terms between minority status and ethnicity. We nd that the coe¢ cients on those
terms are positive but not statistically signicant (except the interaction with the Middle-Belt).
We also note that the interaction term between minority status and the category "other ethnicity"
is removed because this category is treated as a majority group. In Table 10, we treat this category as
a minority group, and so we generate a di¤erent variable for minority status which incorporates this
change. We replicate the analysis in Columns (I)-(III), which yields the results in Columns (IV)-(VI),
respectively. The ndings are qualitatively the same as those found in Columns (I)-(III). These results
clearly show that minorities invest more in human capital than majorities, which validates Prediction
(T4).
4.3.5 Smaller Group Size and Ethnic Fragmentation have Positive E¤ects on Formal
Education Demand
The second way to test prediction (T4) is to estimate the e¤ect of an individuals group size in a
neighborhood on his educational attainment. As we have shown theoretically, a corollary of (T4) is
that local ethnic fragmentation should have a positive e¤ect on the demand for formal education,
which is prediction (T5). To test these two predictions, we estimate the following equation:
Educirs = GroupSizeir1 + ELFr2 + ethnicityi3 +X + s + "irs (3)
where GroupSizeir is the relative population share of individual is ethnic group in neighborhood r;
ELFr is the Hirschman-Herndahl index of ethno-linguistic fragmentation in neighborhood r19; and s
is the state xed e¤ect.20 We also control for ethnicity, and all the child, household and neighborhood
18There is an exception. Table 7, but not Table 8, shows that the proportion of educated adults in the category
"other ethnicity" positively a¤ects the educational attainment of children belonging to the other ethnic groups (except
the Middle-Belt), but the adults from these latter groups do not have a similar e¤ect on children in the category "other
ethnicity", which suggests a one-way integration.
19Let P = fE1; :::; ECg be the collection of ethnic groups in a neighborhood r. Denoting the size of an ethnic group
Ec by nc, the Hirschman-Herndahl index of ethnic fragmentation for that neighborhood is given by:
ELFr = 1 P1cC n2c(n1+:::+nC)2
20Nigeria has 36 states plus the capital city which is sampled separately, and each state, like the capital city, can be
viewed as a collection of neighborhoods. We control for state xed e¤ects (instead of neighborhood xed e¤ects) because
ELFr varies at the neighborhood level, and so controlling for neighborhood xed e¤ects would not allow us to estimate
the e¤ect of ELFr.
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characteristics included in Column (IV) of Table 2. These variables are included incrementally.
The ndings are presented in Table 10. A one-point increase in the relative size of an individuals
ethnic group decreases his educational attainment by 1.5 years if other variables are not controlled for
(Column (I)), by 1.2 years if we control for ethnicity (Column (II)), and by 0.2 years if we additionally
control for child and household characteristics (Column (III)) and state xed e¤ects (Column (IV)).
All these e¤ects are all statistically signicant, clearly validating (T4).
Finally, we test prediction (T5) that local ethnic fragmentation has a positive e¤ect on the demand
for education. In Columns (V)-(VIII), we replicate the analysis in Columns (I)-(IV), now replacing
the relative size of ones ethnic group by the index of ethno-linguistic fractionalization computed at
the neighborhood level. We nd that a one-point increase in that index increases individual education
by 2.3 years when no other control is included (Column (V)), and by 0.5 years when all the controls
are included (Column (VIII)). These e¤ects are all statistically signicant.
Importantly, in Column (IX), we simultaneously control for the neighborhood share of ones ethnic
group and ethnic fragmentation, along with all the other variables in Columns (IV) and (VIII). We
now nd that only ethnic fragmentation has a statistically signicant e¤ect, which simply implies,
consistent with the theory, that the fact that ethnic fragmentation has a positive e¤ect on the demand
for education in Columns (V)-(VIII) is a corollary of the positive e¤ect that being in a smaller group
has on this outcome.
5 Conclusion
We studied the causes of ethnic inequality in human capital investment. Ethnic groups are exoge-
nous, but adherence to group values is endogenous, as is the decision to invest in human capital. We
uncovered important individual- and group-level determinants of educational attainment. An indi-
viduals demand for human capital is a¤ected positively by the ability of his parents and his groups
older cohorts human capital, and negatively by the size of his group. The ndings also imply that
asymmetric equilibrium outcomes may emerge out of identical initial conditions. Particularly, even if
the distribution of ability is identical across all ethnic groups, these groups may still di¤er in average
educational attainment in equilibrium, with the di¤erence mostly occurring among individuals of suf-
ciently low ability, as hgh-ability individuals mostly invest in human capital. Moreover, the results
show that ethnic and group fragmentation increases the "demand" for human capital. The mechanism
is that fragmentation leads to smaller groups, and members of small enough groups invest more in
human capital as they generate little benets from ethnic capital.
We validate all these predictions of the model using nationally representative household data from
Nigeria where tribal a¢ liation and religion are the primary sources of cultural identication. In particu-
lar, we document huge ethnic and religious di¤erences in educational attainment, and explain these dif-
ferences by the fact that low-ability members of historically Muslim groups (i.e. Hausa/Fulani/Kanuri)
choose Koranic education as an alternative to formal education. These ndings also demonstrate the
long-lasting impacts of di¤erential historical exposure to Christianity and Islam on contemporary dif-
28
ferences in educational attainment between ethnic groups in Nigeria. We do not argue that individuals
in the worst-o¤ groups are intrinsically of lower ability as compared to other individuals. Such a claim
would probably be wrong and completely misleading. As shown theoretically, identical groups might
achieve di¤erent outcomes.
The demonstrated positive e¤ect of group fragmentation on the demand for human capital might
explain the highest success of the Yoruba, the most religiously fragmented group. The outcomes
for Yoruba Muslims also o¤er a compelling illustration of the fact that an individual may belong to a
social group without necessarily adhering to its core values when these are in opposition to mainstream
values. Indeed, despite being 46% Muslim, only 0.4% of the Yoruba attend exclusively Koranic schools.
In general, we emprically validate the theoretical prediction that members of smaller groups invest
more in human capital. This also explains why despite the fact that Muslims lag behind Christians
in general, their disadvantage is only apparent in ethnic groups in which they represent a fairly large
share.
Our theoretical ndings also answer a puzzle raised by John Ogbu (1978) who, reecting on the
educational attainment of African Americans, sought to understand why groups of people of the same
ancestry but located in di¤erent regions or countries demonstrated di¤erent educational achievement.
He argued that Black Americans could be partitioned into "voluntary minorities" and "involuntary
minorities" (descendants of Blacks who came to the United States through slavery), and that the latter
tended to adopt an oppositional attitude towards mainstream culture, including formal education. No
such partition of minorities can be achieved in most countries. Yet, our ndings show that members
of the same ethnic group who are located in di¤erent regions of a country are likely to di¤er with
respect to how they accumulate human capital, simply because smaller subgroups perform better than
larger subgroups. This may explain why second and subsequent generation migrants whose parents
have left their region of origin to settle in another region within a country generally do better than
their co-ethnics who remain in their homeland. This will be the case even if the distribution of ability
does not di¤er across the group that left and the one that did not.
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Figure 1-A: Average years of formal education by age and religion 
 
Data Source: Authors’ estimates from the 1999 and 2003 Demographic and Health Surveys 
 
Figure 1-B: Average years of formal education by age and religion adjusted for neighborhood-level education 
supply  
 
Data Source: Authors’ estimates from the 1999 and 2003 Demographic and Health Surveys. Education supply is adjusted by controlling 
for neighborhood fixed effect in a regression of number of years of formal education acquired by an individual on a binary indicator for 
being a Muslim. This regression is run for each of the 20 age groups ranging from age 5 to age 24. The number of years of formal 
education acquired by an average Christian (resp. Muslim) of a given age group is captured by the constant (resp. the sum of the 
constant and the coefficient on Muslim) of the estimated regression for that age group.   
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Figure 2-A: Average years of formal education by age and ethnicity 
 
Data Source: Authors’ estimates from the 1999 and 2003 Demographic and Health Surveys 
 
Figure 2-B: Average years of formal education by age and ethnicity adjusted for neighborhood-level education 
supply 
 
Data Source: Authors’ estimates from the 1999 and 2003 Demographic and Health Surveys. Education supply is adjusted by controlling 
for neighborhood fixed effect in a regression of number of years of formal education acquired by an individual on five binary variables 
for Igbo, Niger-Delta, Middle-Belt, Hausa/Fulani/Kanuri, and other ethnicity, respectively. This regression is run for each of the 20 age 
groups ranging from age 5 to age 24. The number of years of formal education acquired by an average Yoruba of a given age group is 
captured by the constant of the estimated regression for that age group.  Similarly, the number of years of formal education acquired by 
an average individual of a given age group belonging to one of the other ethnic groups is captured by the sum of the constant and the 
coefficient on the binary indicator for that ethnic group of the estimated regression for that age group.   
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Figure 3: Distribution of Christians and Muslims across ethnic groups in Nigeria, 5-24 year olds 
 
Data Source: Authors’ estimates from the 1999 and 2003 Demographic and Health Surveys 
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Figure 4: Proportion (%) of individuals 5-24 years old with only a Koranic education by ethnicity 
 
Data Source: Authors’ estimates from the 1993 Nigeria Migration Survey (NISER (1997)) 
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Table 1: Summary Statistics 
 All Yoruba Igbo Niger-Delta Middle-Belt Hausa/Fulani/Kanuri Other ethnicity 
Variables Mean S.D Mean S.D Mean S.D Mean S.D Mean S.D Mean S.D Mean S.D 
Ethnic groups               
Yoruba 0.156 0.362 1.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Igbo 0.157 0.364 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Niger-Delta 0.102 0.303 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Middle-Belt 0.084 0.278 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Hausa/Fulani/Kanuri 0.281 0.449 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Other ethnicity 0.220 0.414 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.000 
Religion               
Christian 0.516 0.500 0.529 0.499 0.953 0.212 0.942 0.234 0.674 0.469 0.005 0.070 0.590 0.492 
Muslim 0.465 0.499 0.463 0.499 0.003 0.054 0.026 0.159 0.307 0.461 0.992 0.092 0.390 0.488 
Other religion 0.019 0.135 0.008 0.090 0.044 0.206 0.032 0.176 0.019 0.138 0.004 0.060 0.020 0.141 
Minority  0.102 0.303 0.463 0.499 0.003 0.054 0.026 0.159 0.307 0.461 0.005 0.070 0.000 0.000 
Child characteristics               
Male 0.488 0.500 0.506 0.500 0.476 0.499 0.505 0.500 0.485 0.500 0.476 0.499 0.492 0.500 
Age 13.130 5.592 13.492 5.581 13.653 5.530 13.666 5.493 13.048 5.613 12.479 5.589 13.113 5.599 
Biological child of household 
head (HH) 
0.734 0.442 0.762 0.426 0.732 0.443 0.748 0.434 0.749 0.434 0.702 0.457 0.745 0.436 
Household characteristics               
HH is male 0.862 0.345 0.825 0.380 0.747 0.435 0.767 0.423 0.874 0.332 0.958 0.201 0.888 0.316 
Age of HH 47.527 13.769 50.536 14.245 48.833 13.070 48.272 13.897 48.027 14.295 44.599 13.021 47.666 13.895 
HH has no education 0.373 0.484 0.284 0.451 0.218 0.413 0.156 0.363 0.308 0.462 0.617 0.486 0.360 0.480 
HH has Primary education 0.284 0.451 0.261 0.439 0.391 0.488 0.356 0.479 0.313 0.464 0.200 0.400 0.289 0.453 
HH has Secondary education 0.212 0.409 0.277 0.448 0.264 0.441 0.331 0.471 0.215 0.411 0.110 0.313 0.202 0.402 
HH has University education 0.123 0.329 0.168 0.373 0.119 0.323 0.147 0.354 0.154 0.361 0.071 0.256 0.140 0.347 
Urban place of residence 0.359 0.480 0.573 0.495 0.410 0.492 0.248 0.432 0.267 0.443 0.324 0.468 0.302 0.459 
Wealth -0.002 1.855 0.970 1.754 0.534 1.862 0.478 1.787 0.021 1.685 -0.684 1.709 -0.432 1.709 
Year 1999 0.529 0.499 0.639 0.480 0.515 0.500 0.646 0.478 0.483 0.500 0.449 0.497 0.529 0.499 
Year 2003 0.471 0.499 0.361 0.480 0.485 0.500 0.354 0.478 0.517 0.500 0.551 0.497 0.471 0.499 
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Table 2:  OLS, state and neighborhood fixed effect estimates of the effects of ethnicity on number of years of formal education 
among 5-24 year old individuals 
 (I) (II) (III) (IV) (V) (VI) 
Igbo -0.487*** -0.987*** -0.667*** -0.267* -0.122 -0.031 
 (0.171) (0.132) (0.097) (0.159) (0.175) (0.177) 
Niger-Delta -0.419** -0.973*** -0.673*** -0.286** -0.158 -0.056 
 (0.197) (0.143) (0.123) (0.145) (0.192) (0.194) 
Middle-Belt -1.810*** -1.686*** -1.050*** -0.769*** -0.653*** -0.673*** 
 (0.240) (0.192) (0.138) (0.138) (0.189) (0.190) 
Hausa/Fulani/Kanuri -4.049*** -2.821*** -1.626*** -1.307*** -0.963*** -0.670*** 
 (0.166) (0.146) (0.105) (0.146) (0.165) (0.201) 
Other ethnicity -1.869*** -1.700*** -0.847*** -0.454*** -0.480*** -0.288* 
 (0.178) (0.129) (0.092) (0.109) (0.133) (0.149) 
Muslim  -1.091*** -0.800*** -0.797*** -0.544*** -0.849*** 
  (0.118) (0.090) (0.091) (0.099) (0.162) 
Year 2003 0.292** 0.018 0.021 0.011 - - 
 (0.128) (0.102) (0.064) (0.061)   
Child is male  0.433*** 0.386*** 0.391*** 0.386*** 0.385*** 
  (0.041) (0.038) (0.038) (0.037) (0.037) 
Child’s age  0.709*** 0.650*** 0.645*** 0.642*** 0.642*** 
  (0.026) (0.025) (0.025) (0.025) (0.025) 
(Child’s age)^2  -0.008*** -0.006*** -0.006*** -0.006*** -0.006*** 
  (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Biological child of HH  1.255*** 1.170*** 1.147*** 1.147*** 1.146*** 
  (0.070) (0.059) (0.059) (0.059) (0.059) 
HH is male   -0.972*** -0.919*** -0.775*** -0.773*** 
   (0.067) (0.065) (0.065) (0.065) 
Age of HH   0.045*** 0.044*** 0.035*** 0.035*** 
   (0.009) (0.009) (0.008) (0.008) 
(Age of HH)^2   -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
   (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Wealth   0.373*** 0.331*** 0.242*** 0.240*** 
   (0.020) (0.020) (0.021) (0.021) 
HH has primary education   0.571*** 0.529*** 0.345*** 0.342*** 
   (0.055) (0.054) (0.053) (0.053) 
HH has secondary education   1.186*** 1.082*** 0.835*** 0.830*** 
   (0.069) (0.067) (0.066) (0.066) 
HH has university education   1.662*** 1.620*** 1.317*** 1.318*** 
   (0.092) (0.090) (0.091) (0.091) 
Urban place of residence   0.171** 0.220*** - - 
   (0.075) (0.069)   
       
Minority      0.526*** 
      (0.169) 
Constant 5.608*** -2.844*** -4.772*** -5.142*** -4.706*** -4.778*** 
 (0.123) (0.212) (0.295) (0.345) (0.315) (0.313) 
State fixed effect (FE) NO NO NO YES - - 
Neighborhood FE NO NO NO NO YES YES 
Observations 30,746 30,746 30,746 30,746 30,746 30,746 
Number of neighborhoods 761 761 761 761 761 761 
R-squared 0.137 0.547 0.615 0.621 0.602 0.602 
Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the neighborhood level. In Columns (V) and (VI), Year 2003, Urban and State 
dummies are removed after neighborhood fixed effects are included because neighborhoods (or census tracts) sampled in 1999 
are distinct from those sampled in 2003, and no neighborhood simultaneously belongs to the urban and the rural area or to two or 
more different states. Therefore, controlling for neighborhood fixed effects subsumes or entirely controls for each of the removed 
variables. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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Table 3: OLS and neighborhood fixed effect estimates of the effects of ethnicity on number of years of formal education by 
age group.  
 5-9 years old 10-14 years old 15-19 years old 20-24 years old 
 (I) (II) (I) (II) (I) (II) (I) (II) 
Igbo -0.412*** -0.137 -0.701*** -0.316 -0.457*** -0.460* -0.225 -0.415 
 (0.071) (0.121) (0.134) (0.221) (0.166) (0.253) (0.254) (0.424) 
Niger-Delta -0.267*** -0.071 -0.631*** -0.402 -0.501** -0.505 -0.242 -0.187 
 (0.075) (0.105) (0.175) (0.277) (0.236) (0.326) (0.285) (0.450) 
Middle-Belt -0.507*** -0.166 -1.586*** -0.795** -1.486*** -0.418 -2.703*** -1.387*** 
 (0.083) (0.127) (0.212) (0.355) (0.296) (0.378) (0.373) (0.476) 
Hausa/Fulani/Kanuri -0.924*** -0.434*** -2.983*** -1.006*** -4.540*** -1.240*** -5.367*** -1.740*** 
 (0.061) (0.106) (0.151) (0.247) (0.249) (0.351) (0.287) (0.400) 
Other ethnicity -0.556*** -0.289*** -1.736*** -0.749*** -2.166*** -0.836*** -1.969*** -0.473 
 (0.065) (0.095) (0.156) (0.212) (0.212) (0.235) (0.260) (0.324) 
Muslim  -0.053  -0.479***  -0.820***  -0.736*** 
  (0.057)  (0.128)  (0.157)  (0.265) 
Year 2003 -0.233*** - -0.255** - 0.327* - 0.764*** - 
 (0.037)  (0.101)  (0.167)  (0.215)  
Child is male  0.030  0.245***  0.583***  0.857*** 
  (0.021)  (0.050)  (0.078)  (0.113) 
Child age  -0.304***  -0.017  0.029  1.476 
  (0.083)  (0.317)  (0.689)  (1.127) 
(Child age)^2  0.052***  0.027**  0.013  -0.029 
  (0.006)  (0.013)  (0.020)  (0.026) 
Biological child of HH  0.027  0.465***  0.945***  1.878*** 
  (0.042)  (0.069)  (0.104)  (0.152) 
HH is male  -0.151***  -0.391***  -0.738***  -1.084*** 
  (0.049)  (0.085)  (0.123)  (0.162) 
Age of HH  0.011*  0.017  0.012  -0.063*** 
  (0.006)  (0.013)  (0.015)  (0.019) 
(Age of HH)^2  -0.000  -0.000  0.000  0.001*** 
  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Wealth  0.076***  0.208***  0.392***  0.418*** 
  (0.013)  (0.028)  (0.039)  (0.055) 
HH has primary education  0.088***  0.280***  0.502***  0.974*** 
  (0.033)  (0.082)  (0.115)  (0.152) 
HH has secondary 
education 
 0.125***  0.512***  1.115***  2.332*** 
  (0.040)  (0.098)  (0.138)  (0.188) 
HH has university 
education 
 0.311***  1.226***  1.628***  3.154*** 
  (0.062)  (0.119)  (0.172)  (0.246) 
Urban place of residence  -  -  -  - 
         
Constant 1.435*** 0.262 5.138*** -0.370 7.922*** 1.497 8.774*** -10.433 
 (0.058) (0.330) (0.108) (1.891) (0.144) (5.819) (0.202) (12.240) 
Neighborhood FE NO YES NO YES NO YES NO YES 
Observations 10,384 10,384 7,947 7,947 6,909 6,909 5,506 5,506 
Number of neighborhoods 756 756 759 759 751 751 747 747 
R-squared 0.086 0.332 0.201 0.416 0.201 0.484 0.277 0.533 
Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the neighborhood level. In Columns (II), Year 2003, Urban and State dummies are 
removed after neighborhood fixed effects are included because neighborhoods (or census tracts) sampled in 1999 are distinct 
from those sampled in 2003, and no neighborhood simultaneously belongs to the urban and the rural area or to two or more 
different states. Therefore, controlling for neighborhood fixed effects subsumes or entirely controls for each of the removed 
variables. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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Table 4: OLS and neighborhood fixed effect estimates of the effects of ethnicity on primary, secondary and university 
education 
 Primary education Secondary education University education 
 (I) (II) (I) (II) (I) (II) 
       
Igbo -0.013 -0.047* -0.008 0.028 -0.011** -0.011 
 (0.016) (0.025) (0.018) (0.022) (0.005) (0.011) 
Niger-Delta 0.014 -0.041 -0.002 -0.008 -0.005 0.005 
 (0.022) (0.029) (0.020) (0.026) (0.006) (0.012) 
Middle-Belt -0.002 -0.000 -0.116*** -0.015 -0.019*** -0.023** 
 (0.021) (0.027) (0.023) (0.022) (0.005) (0.010) 
Hausa/Fulani/Kanuri -0.226*** -0.071*** -0.295*** -0.043** -0.023*** -0.009 
 (0.017) (0.027) (0.016) (0.020) (0.004) (0.009) 
Other ethnicity -0.048*** -0.030 -0.124*** -0.005 -0.014*** -0.010 
 (0.018) (0.023) (0.017) (0.018) (0.005) (0.008) 
Muslim  0.015  -0.053***  -0.006 
  (0.013)  (0.011)  (0.005) 
Year 2003 0.020* - 0.027** - 0.009*** - 
 (0.012)  (0.011)  (0.003)  
Child is male  0.023***  0.032***  0.002 
  (0.006)  (0.004)  (0.002) 
Child age  0.068***  0.069***  -0.018*** 
  (0.004)  (0.004)  (0.001) 
(Child age)^2  -0.003***  -0.001***  0.001*** 
  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Biological child of HH  -0.056***  0.105***  0.021*** 
  (0.008)  (0.007)  (0.003) 
HH is male  -0.002  -0.052***  -0.017*** 
  (0.009)  (0.008)  (0.003) 
Age of HH  -0.001  0.004***  0.000 
  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.000) 
(Age of HH)^2  0.000  -0.000*  0.000 
  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Wealth  -0.004  0.023***  0.004*** 
  (0.003)  (0.002)  (0.001) 
HH has primary education  0.085***  0.001  0.002 
  (0.009)  (0.006)  (0.002) 
HH has secondary education  0.072***  0.062***  0.001 
  (0.011)  (0.008)  (0.003) 
HH has university education  0.046***  0.062***  0.039*** 
  (0.014)  (0.010)  (0.005) 
Urban place of residence  -  -  - 
       
Constant 0.472*** 0.264*** 0.371*** -0.589*** 0.027*** 0.079*** 
 (0.013) (0.045) (0.014) (0.041) (0.004) (0.016) 
Neighborhood fixed effect NO YES NO YES NO YES 
Observations 30,746 30,746 30,746 30,746 30,746 30,746 
Number of neighborhoods 761 761 761 761 761 761 
R-squared 0.038 0.129 0.072 0.353 0.004 0.103 
Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the neighborhood level. In Columns (II), Year 2003, Urban and State dummies are 
removed after neighborhood fixed effects are included because neighborhoods (or census tracts) sampled in 1999 are distinct 
from those sampled in 2003, and no neighborhood simultaneously belongs to the urban and the rural area or to two or more 
different states. Therefore, controlling for neighborhood fixed effects subsumes or entirely controls for each of the removed 
variables. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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Table 5: OLS and neighborhood fixed effect estimates of the effects of ethnicity on number of years of formal education by 
parental education (or child ability) 
Panel A Analysis restricted to children whose household head has: 
 Some or no 
education 
No education Primary 
education 
Secondary 
education 
University 
education 
      
Igbo -0.461*** -1.577* -0.545* 0.252 -0.155 
 (0.103) (0.930) (0.315) (0.192) (0.270) 
Niger-Delta -0.429*** -0.360 -0.161 0.041 0.018 
 (0.119) (0.721) (0.337) (0.251) (0.323) 
Middle-Belt -1.013*** -1.454*** -0.417 -0.507* -0.923** 
 (0.133) (0.532) (0.323) (0.286) (0.366) 
Hausa/Fulani/Kanuri -1.605*** -1.659*** -0.521 -1.244*** -0.365 
 (0.104) (0.458) (0.317) (0.294) (0.364) 
Other ethnicity -0.854*** -1.358*** -0.490** -0.053 -0.555** 
 (0.090) (0.439) (0.231) (0.228) (0.250) 
Constant -4.566*** -2.660*** -6.340*** -4.242*** -1.080 
 (0.290) (0.665) (0.488) (0.477) (0.952) 
Controls YES YES YES YES YES 
Neighborhood fixed effect YES YES YES YES YES 
Observations 30,746 11,474 8,741 6,525 3,793 
Number of neighborhoods 761 668 690 623 434 
R-squared 0.613 0.512 0.631 0.674 0.730 
      
Panel B Analysis restricted to Muslim children whose household head has: 
 Some or no 
education 
No education Primary 
education 
Secondary 
education 
University 
education 
Igbo 0.990 5.984*** 0.138 -0.354* 3.162*** 
 (0.939) (0.185) (0.985) (0.196) (0.943) 
Niger-Delta 1.489* 0.491 -0.219 2.362 0.057 
 (0.824) (0.500) (0.628) (1.897) (0.998) 
Middle-Belt -0.482 -1.389** 0.095 -0.766 0.094 
 (0.335) (0.630) (0.869) (0.718) (0.965) 
Hausa/Fulani/Kanuri -0.724*** -1.512*** -0.424 -0.578 0.579 
 (0.252) (0.514) (0.406) (0.601) (0.763) 
Other ethnicities -0.420* -1.235** -0.503 0.709 -0.012 
 (0.251) (0.491) (0.353) (0.638) (0.920) 
Constant -3.454*** -2.050*** -3.618*** -3.458*** -1.607 
 (0.478) (0.703) (0.968) (1.154) (2.802) 
Controls YES YES YES YES YES 
Neighborhood fixed effect YES YES YES YES YES 
Observations 14,304 7,867 3,158 2,017 1,194 
Number of neighborhoods 479 403 358 314 190 
R-squared 0.469 0.411 0.497 0.524 0.578 
Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the neighborhood level. The controls are all the variables in Column (V) of Table 2. *** 
p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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Table 6: OLS and neighborhood fixed effect estimates of the effects of ethnicity on number of years of formal education by 
parental wealth (or child ability) 
Panel A Analysis restricted to children whose household fall into the following wealth 
quintile: 
 1st quintile 2nd quintile 3rd quintile 4th quintile 5th quintile 
Igbo -1.840** -1.179** 0.463 0.015 -0.137 
 (0.744) (0.545) (0.529) (0.268) (0.186) 
Niger-Delta -0.767 -0.810 -0.180 -0.255 0.105 
 (0.819) (0.505) (0.576) (0.309) (0.224) 
Middle-Belt -1.098 -1.126* -0.050 -0.781** -0.293 
 (0.694) (0.680) (0.524) (0.332) (0.309) 
Hausa/Fulani/Kanuri -1.621*** -1.321** -0.923* -0.989*** -0.696*** 
 (0.609) (0.551) (0.560) (0.301) (0.240) 
Other ethnicity -1.221** -0.891* 0.147 -0.430* -0.525*** 
 (0.570) (0.498) (0.425) (0.241) (0.183) 
Constant -1.231 -3.043*** -4.959*** -6.282*** -6.314*** 
 (0.765) (0.947) (0.750) (0.598) (0.666) 
Controls YES YES YES YES YES 
Neighborhood fixed effect YES YES YES YES YES 
Observations 7,717 4,278 5,910 6,610 6,231 
Number of neighborhoods 454 440 557 522 401 
R-squared 0.403 0.512 0.551 0.653 0.729 
      
Panel B Analysis restricted to children whose household fall into the following wealth 
quintile: 
 1st quintile 2nd quintile 3rd quintile 4th quintile 5th quintile 
Igbo - - - 1.442*** 1.185 
    (0.256) (0.735) 
Niger-Delta -1.621*** 0.325 -0.932 0.509 2.582*** 
 (0.524) (0.788) (1.069) (1.189) (0.865) 
Middle-Belt -2.785*** 0.710 0.318 -1.108* 0.112 
 (0.654) (0.890) (1.088) (0.564) (0.854) 
Hausa/Fulani/Kanuri -3.114*** -0.730 -0.761 -1.002** -0.787** 
 (0.536) (0.852) (1.030) (0.397) (0.375) 
Other ethnicity -2.911*** -0.236 0.191 -0.389 -1.126** 
 (0.527) (0.788) (0.975) (0.438) (0.456) 
Constant 1.537** -2.745** -3.704*** -5.972*** -6.750*** 
 (0.774) (1.303) (1.275) (1.108) (1.301) 
Controls YES YES YES YES YES 
Neighborhood fixed effect YES YES YES YES YES 
Observations 7,717 4,278 5,910 6,610 6,231 
Number of neighborhoods 262 242 279 271 210 
R-squared 0.152 0.291 0.327 0.509 0.613 
Number of cluster 262 242 279 271 210 
Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the neighborhood level. The controls are all the variables in Column (V) 
of Table 2. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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Table 7: OLS and state fixed effect estimates of the effects of the neighborhood-level proportion of adults with at least a secondary level education on years of 
formal education acquired by individuals 5-24 years old by ethnic group 
Analysis is restricted to individuals belonging to the following ethnic group: 
 All ethnic groups Yoruba Igbo Niger-Delta-Delta Middle-Belt-Belt Hausa/Fulani/Kanuri Other ethnicity 
Neighborhood-level Fraction of 
adults with at least a secondary 
education among: 
(I) (II) (I) (II) (I) (II) (I) (II) (I) (II) (I) (II) (I) (II) 
Yoruba 0.361 -0.065 1.697*** 0.312 -0.946 -0.515 0.340 0.175 -0.044 0.398 0.561*** 0.581** 0.479* 0.019 
 (0.298) (0.165) (0.261) (0.281) (0.582) (0.400) (0.652) (0.597) (0.602) (0.695) (0.197) (0.271) (0.282) (0.272) 
Igbo 0.852*** 0.391*** 0.109 0.034 3.004*** 0.736*** 0.298 0.562** -0.356 0.520 -2.246*** -1.199** 0.040 0.323 
 (0.280) (0.143) (0.319) (0.270) (0.241) (0.236) (0.338) (0.280) (0.335) (0.469) (0.430) (0.577) (0.296) (0.312) 
Niger-Delta 0.015 -0.262 0.877*** 0.206 -0.266 -0.237 0.838** 0.330 0.336 -1.577* -0.015 -0.153 -0.195 -0.568** 
 (0.315) (0.165) (0.279) (0.218) (0.362) (0.288) (0.356) (0.379) (0.740) (0.864) (0.394) (0.371) (0.264) (0.258) 
Middle-Belt 0.383 -0.067 0.036 -0.015 -0.627 -0.283 0.440 -0.631 0.592 0.361 0.200 -0.049 -0.632** -0.227 
 (0.285) (0.160) (0.311) (0.217) (0.563) (0.306) (0.691) (0.459) (0.411) (0.535) (0.210) (0.277) (0.290) (0.352) 
Hausa/Fulani/Kanuri 2.214*** 0.788*** 0.381 -0.115 1.075* 0.349 -0.566 -0.083 0.677 0.904 5.187*** 1.607*** 0.412 0.182 
 (0.336) (0.202) (0.428) (0.387) (0.551) (0.314) (0.780) (0.608) (0.433) (0.747) (0.184) (0.345) (0.255) (0.332) 
Other ethnicity 1.200*** 0.436*** 0.414* 0.113 1.225*** 0.372* 0.594*** 0.355* -0.336 -0.353 0.690*** 0.417* 3.834*** 1.069*** 
 (0.191) (0.105) (0.224) (0.158) (0.275) (0.196) (0.205) (0.183) (0.302) (0.359) (0.127) (0.216) (0.204) (0.297) 
Wealth  0.299***  0.212***  0.217***  0.237***  0.294***  0.318***  0.308*** 
  (0.020)  (0.035)  (0.029)  (0.052)  (0.081)  (0.041)  (0.041) 
HH has primary education  0.494***  0.412***  0.113  0.276  0.093  0.688***  0.557*** 
  (0.054)  (0.131)  (0.103)  (0.196)  (0.195)  (0.085)  (0.130) 
HH has secondary education  0.987***  0.750***  0.336**  0.703***  0.362  1.106***  0.970*** 
  (0.066)  (0.144)  (0.141)  (0.187)  (0.240)  (0.146)  (0.162) 
HH has university education  1.494***  1.257***  0.743***  1.303***  0.846***  1.792***  1.386*** 
  (0.090)  (0.187)  (0.172)  (0.231)  (0.278)  (0.227)  (0.184) 
               
Constant 3.375*** -5.384*** 4.063*** -10.418*** 4.378*** -6.569*** 6.776*** -6.697*** 5.082*** -3.930*** 2.888*** -1.133 2.994*** -5.707*** 
 (0.528) (0.409) (0.415) (0.634) (0.638) (1.155) (0.912) (1.003) (0.805) (1.190) (0.549) (1.021) (0.406) (0.779) 
               
Controls NO YES NO YES NO YES NO YES NO YES NO YES NO YES 
State fixed effect NO YES NO YES NO YES NO YES NO YES NO YES NO YES 
Observations 30,746 30,746 4,782 4,782 4,836 4,836 3,144 3,144 2,587 2,587 8,639 8,639 6,758 6,758 
R-squared 0.194 0.624 0.037 0.734 0.064 0.760 0.039 0.726 0.064 0.591 0.157 0.412 0.112 0.590 
Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the neighborhood level. The neighborhood-level Fraction of adults with at least a secondary education among the Yoruba, for 
example, is the proportion of Yoruba aged 25 or older with at least a secondary education. The controls are all the variables in Column (IV) of Table 2 in addition to 6 binary 
indicators for the presence of each ethnic group in a neighborhood.   *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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Table 8: OLS and state fixed effect estimates of the effects of the neighborhood-level proportion of adults with a university level education on years of formal 
education acquired by children 5-24 years old by ethnic group 
Analysis is restricted to individuals belonging to the following ethnic group: 
 All ethnic groups Yoruba Igbo Niger-Delta-Delta Middle-Belt-Belt Hausa/Fulani/Kanuri Other ethnicity 
Neighborhood-level fraction of adults with university 
education among: (I) (II) (I) (II) (I) (II) (I) (II) (I) (II) (I) (II) (I) (II) 
 0.017 -0.033 2.478*** -0.132 0.069 0.275 -0.080 -0.523 -0.501 -0.175 0.385 0.701** 0.416 -0.296 
Yoruba (0.117) (0.163) (0.356) (0.314) (0.442) (0.308) (0.385) (0.363) (0.427) (0.641) (0.261) (0.299) (0.264) (0.295) 
 0.704*** 0.105 0.416 0.128 3.257*** 0.617* 0.421 1.099** -0.322 0.635 -1.690*** -0.263 -0.101 -0.371 
Igbo (0.142) (0.152) (0.347) (0.291) (0.377) (0.316) (0.523) (0.531) (0.686) (0.901) (0.284) (0.389) (0.311) (0.313) 
 -0.165 -0.384** 0.425 0.198 -1.432*** -0.402* 2.515*** 0.838 -1.493 -1.889 -1.270** -1.436*** -0.205 -0.261 
Niger-Delta (0.152) (0.162) (0.311) (0.286) (0.377) (0.212) (0.525) (0.562) (0.979) (1.415) (0.563) (0.460) (0.309) (0.334) 
 0.306** 0.104 -0.312 0.152 -0.493 -0.185 0.496 0.247 1.510*** 0.965* 0.178 0.107 -1.060*** -0.327 
Middle-Belt (0.139) (0.162) (0.380) (0.269) (0.504) (0.298) (0.664) (0.831) (0.440) (0.554) (0.208) (0.279) (0.335) (0.400) 
 2.324*** 0.622* 0.500 0.212 1.118 0.513 -0.131 -0.010 0.561 1.516* 7.145*** 1.767*** -0.427 -0.680* 
Hausa/Fulani/Kanuri (0.199) (0.332) (0.819) (0.519) (0.751) (0.418) (0.916) (0.879) (0.734) (0.864) (0.323) (0.570) (0.332) (0.359) 
 1.369*** 0.521*** -0.240 0.040 0.696* 0.250 1.024*** 0.252 -0.860*** -0.139 0.996*** 0.778** 4.714*** 1.415*** 
Other ethnicity (0.107) (0.165) (0.394) (0.322) (0.364) (0.226) (0.240) (0.240) (0.288) (0.301) (0.201) (0.319) (0.285) (0.405) 
  0.302***  0.224***  0.231***  0.232***  0.283***  0.312***  0.317*** 
Wealth  (0.019)  (0.034)  (0.030)  (0.047)  (0.079)  (0.039)  (0.042) 
  0.507***  0.424***  0.116  0.279  0.095  0.694***  0.555*** 
HH has primary education  (0.054)  (0.132)  (0.105)  (0.197)  (0.191)  (0.087)  (0.126) 
  1.061***  0.806***  0.450***  0.773***  0.435*  1.355***  1.133*** 
HH has secondary education  (0.068)  (0.144)  (0.133)  (0.182)  (0.241)  (0.141)  (0.157) 
  1.523***  1.318***  0.744***  1.264***  0.714***  1.770***  1.378*** 
HH has university education  (0.091)  (0.198)  (0.186)  (0.235)  (0.272)  (0.230)  (0.190) 
Constant 4.081*** -5.087*** 5.462*** -10.023*** 5.803*** -7.257*** 7.059*** -6.620*** 5.820*** -4.597*** 2.400*** -2.002** 4.182*** -4.853*** 
 (0.117) (0.392) (0.271) (0.541) (0.422) (1.317) (0.610) (0.851) (0.487) (1.350) (0.230) (0.807) (0.256) (0.729) 
Controls NO YES NO YES NO YES NO YES NO YES NO YES NO YES 
State fixed effect NO YES NO YES NO YES NO YES NO YES NO YES NO YES 
Observations 30,746 30,746 4,782 4,782 4,836 4,836 3,144 3,144 2,587 2,587 8,639 8,639 6,758 6,758 
R-squared 0.152 0.623 0.036 0.734 0.044 0.759 0.045 0.726 0.068 0.591 0.127 0.411 0.099 0.589 
Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the neighborhood level. The neighborhood-level fraction of adults with at least a university education among the Yoruba, for example, is the 
proportion of Yoruba aged 25 or older with at least a university education. The controls are all the variables in Column (IV) of Table 2 in addition to 6 binary indicators for the presence of 
each ethnic group in a neighborhood.   *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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Table 9: OLS and neighborhood fixed effect estimates of the effect of being an ethno-religious minority on years of formal education 
 (I) (II) (III) (IV) (V) (VI) 
Minority 0.932*** 0.526*** 0.509** 0.343** 0.526*** 0.509** 
 (0.190) (0.169) (0.210) (0.140) (0.169) (0.210) 
Igbo  -0.031 -0.069  -0.031 -0.069 
  (0.177) (0.186)  (0.177) (0.186) 
Niger-Delta  -0.056 -0.112  -0.056 -0.112 
  (0.194) (0.202)  (0.194) (0.202) 
Middle-Belt  -0.673*** -0.721***  -0.673*** -0.721*** 
  (0.190) (0.230)  (0.190) (0.230) 
Hausa/Fulani/Kanuri  -0.670*** -0.654***  -0.670*** -0.654*** 
  (0.201) (0.224)  (0.201) (0.224) 
Other ethnicity  -0.288* -0.293*  -0.814*** -0.802*** 
  (0.149) (0.160)  (0.168) (0.180) 
Minority*Igbo   0.988   0.988 
   (0.614)   (0.614) 
Minority*Niger-Delta   0.811**   0.811** 
   (0.393)   (0.393) 
Minority*Middle-Belt   0.127   0.127 
   (0.291)   (0.291) 
Minority*Hausa/Fulani/Kanuri   -0.550   -0.550 
   (0.613)   (0.613) 
Minority*Other ethnicity   -   - 
       
Muslim  -0.849*** -0.891***  -0.849*** -0.891*** 
  (0.162) (0.188)  (0.162) (0.188) 
       
Constant 3.829*** -4.778*** -4.748*** 3.814*** -4.778*** -4.748*** 
 (0.091) (0.313) (0.314) (0.106) (0.313) (0.314) 
Controls NO YES YES NO YES YES 
Neighborhood fixed effect NO YES YES NO YES YES 
Observations 30,746 30,746 30,746 30,746 30,746 30,746 
Number of neighborhoods 761 761 761 761 761 761 
R-squared 0.005 0.602 0.605 0.001 0.602 0.605 
Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the neighborhood level.  The controls are all the variables in Column (V) of Table 2.  In Columns (I)-
(III), minority is a binary variable that takes the value of 1 if an individual is Muslim Igbo, Muslim Yoruba, Muslim Niger-Delta, Muslim Middle-
Belt, or Christian Hausa/Fulani/Kanuri, and takes the value 0 otherwise. In Columns (IV)-(VI), minority is a binary variable that takes the value of 1 if 
an individual is Muslim Igbo, Muslim Yoruba, Muslim Niger-Delta, Muslim Middle-Belt, Christian Hausa/Fulani/Kanuri, or belongs to any of the 
other ethnicities, and takes the value 0 otherwise.   *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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Table 10: OLS and state fixed effect estimates of the effects of neighborhood-level ethnic group size and ethnic fragmentation on years of formal 
education  
 (I) (II) (III) (IV) (V) (VI) (VII) (VIII) (IX) 
Population share of own ethnic group in the neighborhood -1.543*** -1.278*** -0.209* -0.227**     0.046 
 (0.255) (0.220) (0.115) (0.115)     (0.123) 
Neighborhood ethnic heterogeneity     2.304*** 2.098*** 0.314* 0.458** 0.503** 
     (0.365) (0.295) (0.168) (0.181) (0.217) 
Igbo  -0.494*** -0.678*** -0.351**  -0.361** -0.661*** -0.334** -0.323** 
  (0.169) (0.097) (0.158)  (0.169) (0.096) (0.156) (0.161) 
Niger-Delta  -0.453** -0.691*** -0.342**  -0.404** -0.688*** -0.333** -0.326** 
  (0.193) (0.123) (0.147)  (0.191) (0.123) (0.146) (0.148) 
Middle-Belt  -1.874*** -1.072*** -0.812***  -1.836*** -1.071*** -0.805*** -0.800***
  (0.241) (0.138) (0.136)  (0.235) (0.138) (0.134) (0.134) 
Hausa/Fulani/Kanuri  -4.014*** -1.629*** -1.338***  -3.962*** -1.630*** -1.349*** -1.347***
  (0.165) (0.105) (0.145)  (0.164) (0.105) (0.144) (0.145) 
Other ethnicity  -1.994*** -0.881*** -0.504***  -1.946*** -0.879*** -0.492*** -0.486***
  (0.183) (0.095) (0.112)  (0.181) (0.095) (0.111) (0.113) 
          
Constant 5.242*** 6.693*** -4.584*** -4.878*** 3.560*** 5.213*** -4.797*** -5.107*** -5.158***
 (0.225) (0.232) (0.308) (0.368) (0.137) (0.136) (0.296) (0.348) (0.379) 
Controls NO NO YES YES NO NO YES YES YES 
State fixed effect NO NO NO YES NO NO NO YES YES 
Observations 30,746 30,746 30,746 30,746 30,746 30,746 30,746 30,746 30,746 
R-squared 0.010 0.143 0.615 0.622 0.014 0.148 0.615 0.622 0.622 
Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the neighborhood level.  The controls are all the variables in Column (IV) of Table 2.  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
  
